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Abstract
This paper brings together recent developments on the growth-at-risk methodology and 
the literature on the impact of macroprudential policy. For this purpose, I extend the recent 
proposals on the use of quantile regressions of GDP growth by including macrofinancial 
variables with early warning properties of systemic risk, and macroprudential 
measures. I identify heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policy on GDP growth, 
uncovering important benefits on the left tail of its distribution. The positive effect of 
macroprudential policy on reducing the downside risk of GDP is found to be larger than 
the negative impact on the median, suggesting a net positive effect in the mid-term. 
Nonetheless, I identify heterogeneous effects depending on the position in the financial 
cycle, the direction of the policy, the type of instrument, and the time elapsed since its 
implementation. In particular, tightening capital measures during expansions may take 
up to two years in evidencing benefits on growth-at-risk, while the positive impact of 
borrower-based measures is rapidly observed. This suggests the need of implementing 
capital measures, such as the countercyclical capital buffer, early enough in the cycle; 
while borrower-based measures can be tightened in more advanced stages. Conversely, 
in downturns the benefits of loosening capital measures are immediate, while those of 
borrower-based measures are limited. Overall, this study provides a useful framework 
to assess costs and benefits of macroprudential policy in terms of GDP growth, and to 
identify the term-structure of specific types of instruments.
Keywords: financial stability, growth-at-risk, systemic risk, macroprudential policy, 
quantile regressions.
JEL classification: C32, E32, E58, G01, G28.
Resumen
Este estudio une los desarrollos recientes sobre la metodología de crecimiento en 
riesgo con la literatura sobre evaluaciones de impacto de la política macroprudencial. 
Para ello, extiendo el uso de regresiones cuantílicas del crecimiento del PIB con el 
objetivo de incluir variables macrofinancieras con propiedades de alerta temprana 
de riesgo sistémico y medidas macroprudenciales. Como resultado, encuentro efectos 
heterogéneos de la política macroprudencial sobre el crecimiento del PIB, los cuales 
permiten identificar beneficios importantes sobre la cola izquierda de su distribución. 
Este efecto positivo de la política macroprudencial en la reducción del crecimiento 
en riesgo es mayor que el impacto negativo sobre la mediana de la distribución, 
lo que sugiere un efecto neto positivo en el medio plazo. No obstante, estos efectos son 
heterogéneos y dependen de la posición en el ciclo financiero, la dirección de la política, 
el tipo de instrumento implementado y el tiempo transcurrido desde su implementación. 
En particular, el endurecimiento de medidas de capital durante fases expansivas del 
ciclo puede tardar hasta dos años en evidenciar beneficios sobre el crecimiento en 
riesgo, mientras que el efecto positivo de medidas de límites a los estándares crediticios 
se materializaría rápidamente. Esto sugiere la necesidad de implementar medidas de 
capital, como el colchón de capital anticíclico, con suficiente antelación respecto al 
desarrollo del ciclo, mientras que el endurecimiento de límites a los estándares crediticios 
podría implementarse en etapas más avanzadas. Por otra parte, durante episodios de 
crisis financieras, los beneficios de la liberación de capital son inmediatos, mientras 
que los de la relajación de límites a los estándares de crédito son más limitados. En 
general, este estudio brinda un marco de gran utilidad para la evaluación de los costes y 
los beneficios de la política macroprudencial en términos de crecimiento del PIB 
y permite identificar la estructura temporal de instrumentos específicos.
Palabras clave: crecimiento en riesgo, estabilidad financiera, política macroprudencial, 
regresiones cuantílicas, riesgo sistémico.
Códigos JEL: C32, E32, E58, G01, G28.
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis has evidenced the high costs of the accumulation of financial 
imbalances for the real economy. Aikman et al. (2019a) estimate that financial vulnerabilities 
built-up during the previous years to the great recession explain around three-quarters of the 
subsequent output loss in the US. Moreover, they identify that the magnitude of the negative 
impact could have been significantly reduced by the active use of macroprudential policies. 
Certainly, preventing and mitigating large negative effects of systemic risk on economic growth 
is the ultimate objective of macroprudential policy (ECB, 2009; ESRB, 2015).  
Against this background, several recent empirical studies have assessed the effects of either 
individual or broad sets of macroprudential policies. Most of those studies have found important 
benefits in different dimensions. Claessens et al. (2013) find that macroprudential policy reduces 
asset prices and leverage growth by studying the effect of borrower-based measures on 
individual banks. Cerutti et al. (2017) identify that macroprudential measures are very effective 
on reducing credit growth during booming periods through a wide cross-country study. Also, 
using a broad sample of countries, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) identify that 
macroprudential measures are effective curbing credit growth and house prices appreciation 
and that, in particular, borrower-based measures are the most effective. Also, a set of studies 
have assessed the impact of macroprudential policy in terms of probabilities. Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2016) find that macroprudential policies are effective on reducing the probability of systemic 
crises, Jiménez et al. (2017) identify that countercyclical capital measures increase the 
probability of survivor of firms, and Altunbas et al. (2018) find that macroprudential policy 
reduces the probability of banks’ default.  
However, these measures are difficult to be translated in terms of a more homogeneous and 
standardised measure of economic activity. In this regard, some few recent studies have 
assessed directly the impact of macroprudential policies on GDP growth, finding negative effects 
on the conditional mean. Kim and Mehrotra (2018) identify a negative impact of macroprudential 
policy on output after analysing an aggregation of many different instruments in Asian 
economies. Focusing on borrower-based measures, Richter et al. (2018) find that these 
instruments have negative effects on output growth over a four-year horizon and that the effects 
are clearer when they are tightened than when they are loosened. Regarding capital measures, 
Bedayo et al. (2018) identify negative effects of tightening this type of instruments on GDP growth 
in the short-run after studying the financial cycle in Spain over the last 150 years. These negative 
effects can be seen as costs of macroprudential policy. However, this would leave the analysis 
of the benefits in terms of different units of measure, which makes difficult a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
In this context, Boar et al. (2017) have shed some light on the benefits of macroprudential policy 
in terms of output by analysing its impact on the variance of the GDP growth distribution. The 
authors find that the most active countries in the use of macroprudential policy achieve a 
reduction in the variance of GDP growth which minimizes the likelihood of severe contractions. 
Thus, the reduction in the magnitude of GDP contractions that occur with certain probability 
could be seen as the potential benefits of macroprudential policy. This idea has been recently 
explored by Duprey and Ueberfeldt (2018) and Aikman et al. (2019b). The former study focuses 
on the complementarity between macroprudential and monetary policy, while the latter intends 
to forecast the GDP growth distribution conditional on the level of banks capital ratio. These two 
studies take advantage of the flexibility of quantile regressions to identify the impact on the left-
tail of the GDP growth distribution, which can be interpreted as the downside risk of GDP. 
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The magnitude of a decline in GDP that occurs with a probability of 5% is known in the literature 
as growth-at-risk. In a recent study, Adrian et al. (2019) have evidenced the usefulness of this 
method for disentangling heterogeneous effects of macrofinancial variables on the GDP growth 
distribution. Certainly, the authors provide new evidence on the underestimation of downside 
GDP tail risk when using traditional models focused on the conditional mean, and on the 
importance of accounting for financial conditions in explaining the skewness of the GDP growth 
distribution at horizons of up to 1 year.1 
 
Departing from that study, some extensions have been recently proposed. Adrian et al. (2018) 
apply a panel quantile regression to a sample of 22 advanced and emerging economies, where 
the distribution of GDP growth up to 8 quarters ahead is estimated conditional on inflation, a 
dummy identifying credit boom periods, GDP growth, and a financial conditions index. The focus 
of that study is to show that financial conditions not only affect the GDP growth distribution but 
also that its effects change over a 12-quarter projection horizon. Aikman et al. (2018) also applies 
a quantile regression to study the downside risk of GDP growth in the UK. The authors include 
two macrofinancial indices related to leverage and assets valuation, which are found to have 
good early warning properties of systemic crises. The authors find out that leverage imbalances 
and assets prices disequilibria have large negative effects on the left tail of the GDP growth 
distribution 4 and 12 quarters ahead. Loria et al. (2019) propose to use quantile regressions and 
local projections, as in Jorda (2005), in order to identify the effects of monetary policy, credit 
conditions, and productivity shocks on the tails of the GDP growth distribution. Applying this 
method to US data, the authors find that the effects of these shocks affect disproportionately 
more the left tail than other quantiles. 
 
In this context, the growth-at-risk methodology offers a useful framework to assess the impact 
of macroprudential policies, not only due to the importance of the linkages between the financial 
sector and the real economy but also because mitigating the negative effects of financial 
imbalances on economic growth is the ultimate objective of macroprudential policy.2 Against this 
background, the aim of this study is to bring together both strands of literature, on the impact 
assessment of macroprudential policy and growth-at-risk, in order to uncover heterogeneous 
effects of macroprudential policy on the GDP growth distribution that may facilitate the 
identification of costs and benefits in terms of the same unit of measure.   
For this purpose, I extend the work in Adrian et al. (2019) by estimating quantile regressions of 
future GDP growth up to four years ahead on different types of macroprudential measures and 
macrofinancial variables related to credit, house prices, external imbalances and financial stress. 
I use a large sample of the 28 European Union (EU) countries from 1970 to 2018, which allows 
accounting for very different types of macroprudential measures while controlling for unobserved 
country-specific heterogeneity. This is a similar approach to that in Aikman et al. (2019b) but 
including the effect of a broad set of macroprudential policies rather than predicting the impact 
of changes in the banks’ capital ratio. Thus, this study focuses on the marginal effects of 
macroprudential policy and the term structure of its impact rather than forecasting GDP growth. 
This work is also related to that presented by Duprey and Ueberfeldt (2018), who assess the 
effect of macroprudential measures in Canada through an index summarizing different policies. 
                                                   
1 Although previous studies have proposed methods for the estimation of conditional predictive distributions of GDP 
growth (see Hamilton, 1989; Primiceri, 2005; Smith and Vahey, 2016; for two-state Markov chain, Bayesian VAR and 
Copula estimates, respectively), quantile regressions (Koenker and Basset, 1978) offer an easy and flexible method in 
terms of computation effort and requirements of assumptions. These properties have also extended its application to 
financial stability issues. In this context, the use of this tool by IMF (2017) has brought the topic to the policy debate.  
2 See ECB (2009) and ESRB (2015) for a definition of macroprudential policy and its objectives, as well as a description 
of the macroprudential framework in the European Union. 
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Nonetheless, the aim of the authors is to study the interaction between macroprudential and 
monetary policy by assuming that macroprudential policy affects the left-tail while monetary 
policy affects the median of the GDP growth distribution. Thus, the authors use quantile 
regressions as a first step of a broader analysis of shocks through a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model; while in this work the impact of macroprudential policy is assessed across the entire 
distribution and ov r time in ord r to disentangle potenti l costs and be fits of th se policies.  
 
Another close study to this paper is the one by Sánchez and Röhn (2016), who include a set of 
macroprudential measures into a quantile regression using a panel data set of OECD countries. 
However, the aim of the authors is to study the effect of a broad range of policies including 
labour market, quality of institutions and banking supervision. Thus, the authors omit key
macrofinancial controls associated to the activation of macroprudential policies such as 
measures of the build-up of systemic risk. The authors also focus on contemporaneous effects 
on the GDP growth distribution, which does not capture the impact of these policies over a mid-
term span, which is key from a macroprudential policy perspective. In fact, the analysis of the 
impact over a mid-term horizon provides interesting insights on the speed and persistence of 
macroprudential policy over the GDP growth distribution. The present study also analyses the 
role of the financial cycle on the relationship between macroprudential policy and GDP growth, 
which allows differentiating between the effects of tightening and loosening policies. Finally, a 
more detailed analysis of the two most used types of macroprudential measures is performed, 
i.e. borrower-based and capital measures.  
 
The results of this study uncover important heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies 
on GDP growth. While macroprudential policy is found to have significant positive effects on 
reducing the downside risk of GDP, the impact on the median and the right tail of the distribution 
tend to be negative. These differential effects can be interpreted as benefits and costs of 
macroprudential policy. Moreover, the position in the financial cycle is identified to have a 
significant role on determining the magnitude and speed of the effects of macroprudential policy 
on the GDP growth distribution. In particular, tightening macroprudential policy during normal 
times and expansionary phases has a large positive impact on growth-at-risk in the mid-term, 
while loosening policies during crises has immediate positive effects on reducing the downside 
risk of GDP. A further inspection of the impact of specific types of instruments during normal 
times or expansions suggests rapid and persistent positive effects of tightening borrower-based 
measures on the left-tail of the GDP growth distribution, while the benefits of implementing 
capital measures may take around 8 quarters in being observed. Conversely, when crises 
materialize releasing capital has rapid positive effects, while loosening borrower-based 
measures has a limited impact. From a policy perspective, these results would encourage 
macroprudential authorities to implement capital measures early enough in the cycle, while 
policy actions to tighten lending standards could be implemented in advanced stages.  
 
Overall, this study provides a useful framework to assess costs and benefits of macroprudential 
policies in terms of GDP growth, and to identify the term-structure of specific macroprudential 
instruments.  
 
Besides this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized in four additional sections. Section 
2 describes the data and presents an inspection of the main variables. Section 3 describes the 
methodology and presents the proposed empirical specification. Section 4 analyses the 
estimation results by focusing on the impact of macroprudential policies on the conditional GDP 
growth distribution over the cycle. Section 5 presents some robustness exercises. Finally, 
section 6 concludes the paper and discusses some implications for policymakers. 
 
3 
 
The magnitude of a decline in GDP that occurs with a probability of 5% is known in the literature 
as growth-at-risk. In a recent study, Adrian et al. (2019) have evidenced the usefulness of this 
method for disentangling heterogeneous effects of macrofinancial variables on the GDP growth 
distribution. Certainly, the authors provide new evidence on the underestimation of downside 
GDP tail risk when using traditional models focused on the conditional mean, and on the 
importance of accounting for financial conditions in explaining the skewness of the GDP growth 
distribution at horizons of up to 1 year.1 
 
Departing from that study, some extensions have been recently proposed. Adrian et al. (2018) 
apply a panel quantile regression to a sample of 22 advanced and emerging economies, where 
the distribution of GDP growth up to 8 quarters ahead is estimated conditional on inflation, a 
dummy identifying credit boom periods, GDP growth, and a financial conditions index. The focus 
of that study is to show that financial conditions not only affect the GDP growth distribution but 
also that its effects change over a 12-quarter projection horizon. Aikman et al. (2018) also applies 
a quantile regression to study the downside risk of GDP growth in the UK. The authors include 
two macrofinancial indices related to leverage and assets valuation, which are found to have 
good early warning properties of systemic crises. The authors find out that leverage imbalances 
and assets prices disequilibria have large negative effects on the left tail of the GDP growth 
distribution 4 and 12 quarters ahead. Loria et al. (2019) propose to use quantile regressions and 
local projections, as in Jorda (2005), in order to identify the effects of monetary policy, credit 
conditions, and productivity shocks on the tails of the GDP growth distribution. Applying this 
method to US data, the authors find that the effects of these shocks affect disproportionately 
more the left tail than other quantiles. 
 
In this context, the growth-at-risk methodology offers a useful framework to assess the impact 
of macroprudential policies, not only due to the importance of the linkages between the financial 
sector and the real economy but also because mitigating the negative effects of financial 
imbalances on economic growth is the ultimate objective of macroprudential policy.2 Against this 
background, the aim of this study is to bring together both strands of literature, on the impact 
assessment of macroprudential policy and growth-at-risk, in order to uncover heterogeneous 
effects of macroprudential policy on the GDP growth distribution that may facilitate the 
identification of costs and benefits in terms of the same unit of measure.   
For this purpose, I extend the work in Adrian et al. (2019) by estimating quantile regressions of 
future GDP growth up to four years ahead on different types of macroprudential measures and 
macrofinancial variables related to credit, house prices, external imbalances and financial stress. 
I use a large sample of the 28 European Union (EU) countries from 1970 to 2018, which allows 
accounting for very different types of macroprudential measures while controlling for unobserved 
country-specific heterogeneity. This is a similar approach to that in Aikman et al. (2019b) but 
including the effect of a broad set of macroprudential policies rather than predicting the impact 
of changes in the banks’ capital ratio. Thus, this study focuses on the marginal effects of 
macroprudential policy and the term structure of its impact rather than forecasting GDP growth. 
This work is also related to that presented by Duprey and Ueberfeldt (2018), who assess the 
effect of macroprudential measures in Canada through an index summarizing different policies. 
                                                   
1 Although previous studies have proposed m thods for the estimatio  of conditional predictive distributions of GDP
growth (see Hamilton, 1989; Pri iceri, 2005; Smith an  Vahey, 2016; for two-state Markov chain, Bayesian VAR and 
C pula estimates, respectively), quantile regressions (Koenker and Basset, 1978) offer an e sy and flexible method in 
terms of computation effort and requirements of assumptions. These properties have also extended its application to 
financial stability is ues. In this context, the use of this t ol by IMF (2017) has brought the topic to the policy debate.  
2 See ECB (2009) and ESRB (2015) for a definition of macroprudential policy and its objectives, as well as a description 
of the macroprudential fram work in the European Union. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2007
 
5 
 
2. Data  
The data set comprises quarterly time series for the 28 European Union countries from 1970Q1 
to 2018Q4. This is an unbalanced panel containing 5,488 observations. The data sources of the 
variables are the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
Besides the annual growth of GDP, the set of variables comprises the 2-year average change in 
the credit-to-GDP ratio, the 2-year average change in house prices, the current account balance, 
the Country-Level Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS), and a broad set of macroprudential 
measures collected in the ECB Macroprudential Database. A summary statistics of the 
macrofinancial variables is presented in Table 1. An inspection of these variables and their 
relationship to the GDP growth distribution is presented below.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
GDP (1y Growth) -0.0255 0.0116 0.0273 0.0429 0.0742 
Credit-to-GDP (2y Av. Change) -0.1231 -0.0203 0.0349 0.0898 0.2061 
House prices (2y Av. Growth) -0.1252 0.0126 0.0980 0.1985 0.3860 
Current account balance (% GDP) -9.5471 -3.1887 0.6368 1.9380 7.0951 
CLIFS 0.0303 0.0594 0.0984 0.1709 0.3411 
Source: ECB and BIS. 
 
2.1. GDP growth and macrofinancial variables 
The variable of interest (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ) is defined as the annualized average growth rate of real GDP for 
every country over a time horizon h from 1 to 16 quarters ahead, as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ln (
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ−4
) ; ℎ = 1,… ,16    (1) 
A first inspection of this variable shows that its distribution is far from being normal due to the 
presence of fat tails as has been previously documented (see, Adrian et al, 2019; Loria et al, 
2019). In Figure A1 in the Annex it can be observed that the left tail presents a higher density 
and may justify the need of a different fitting for the left tail than for the median or the mean.  
The relationship between different quantiles of the GDP growth distribution and the systemic risk 
variables is an indication of the heterogeneous effects of these measures on the variable of 
interest. To explore this, I estimate simple pooled quantile regressions of GDP growth at the 5th, 
50th and 95th percentiles. Figure 1 shows the predicted values of these estimations for real GDP 
growth 4 and 12 quarters ahead. It is observed that not only the level but also the slope of the 
fitted values at the tails of the distribution are different from those at the median suggesting that 
quantile regressions may allow identifying heterogeneous effects of these variables on the GDP 
growth distribution. The fitted values for the 5th quantile are particularly different, evidencing that 
the effects at the tails are not symmetric. This is in line with the findings by Adrian et al (2019) 
using a financial conditions index. 
There are also differences in terms of the horizon used for GDP growth. While the financial stress 
index evidences large differences in the fitted values of GDP growth 1-year ahead, the three 
cyclical systemic risk indicators exhibit larger differences 3-years ahead. This is consistent with 
previous studies exploring the use of early-warning systemic risk measures in quantile 
estimations of GDP growth (see Aikman et al., 2018; Lang et al., 2019). This also indicates the 
usefulness of including measures of cyclical systemic risk with good mid-term early-warning 
properties for characterizing GDP growth at longer horizons, which is not achievable using a 
financial conditions index only (see Adrian et al., 2019).  
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2. Data  
The data set comprises quarterly time series for the 28 European Union countries from 1970Q1 
to 2018Q4. This is an unbalanced panel containing 5,488 observations. The data sources of the 
variables are the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
Besides the annual growth of GDP, the set of variables comprises the 2-year average change in 
the credit-to-GDP ratio, the 2-year average change in house prices, the current account balance, 
the Country-Level Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS), and a broad set of macroprudential 
measures collected in the ECB Macroprudential Database. A summary statistics of the 
macrofinancial variables is presented in Table 1. An inspection of these variables and their 
relationship to the GDP growth distribution is presented below.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
GDP (1y Growth) -0.0255 0.0116 0.0273 0.0429 0.0742 
Credit-to-GDP (2y Av. Change) -0.1231 -0.0203 0.0349 0.0898 0.2061 
House prices (2y Av. Growth) -0.1252 0.0126 0.0980 0.1985 0.3860 
Current account balance (% GDP) -9.5471 -3.1887 0.6368 1.9380 7.0951 
CLIFS 0.0303 0.0594 0.0984 0.1709 0.3411 
Source: ECB and BIS. 
 
2.1. GDP growth and macrofinancial variables 
The variable of interest (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ) is defined as the annualized average growth rate of real GDP for 
every country over a time horizon h from 1 to 16 quarters ahead, as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ = ln (
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ−4
) ; ℎ = 1,… ,16    (1) 
A first inspection of this variable shows that its distribution is far from being normal due to the 
presence of fat tails as has been previously documented (see, Adrian et al, 2019; Loria et al, 
2019). In Figure A1 in the Annex it can be observed that the left tail presents a higher density 
and may justify the need of a different fitting for the left tail than for the median or the mean.  
The relationship between different quantiles of the GDP growth distribution and the systemic risk 
variables is an indication of the heterogeneous effects of these measures on the variable of 
interest. To explore this, I estimate simple pooled quantile regressions of GDP growth at the 5th, 
50th and 95th percentiles. Figure 1 shows the predicted values of these estimations for real GDP 
growth 4 and 12 quarters ahead. It is observed that not only the level but also the slope of the 
fitted values at the tails of the distribution are different from those at the median suggesting that 
quantile regressions may allow identifying heterogeneous effects of these variables on the GDP 
growth distribution. The fitted values for the 5th quantile are particularly different, evidencing that 
the effects at the tails are not symmetric. This is in line with the findings by Adrian et al (2019) 
using a financial conditions index. 
There are also differences in terms of the horizon used for GDP growth. While the financial stress 
index evidences large differences in the fitted values of GDP growth 1-year ahead, the three 
cyclical systemic risk indicators exhibit larger differences 3-years ahead. This is consistent with 
previous studies exploring the use of early-warning systemic risk measures in quantile 
estimations of GDP growth (see Aikman et al., 2018; Lang et al., 2019). This also indicates the 
usefulness of including measures of cyclical systemic risk with good mid-term early-warning 
properties for characterizing GDP growth at longer horizons, which is not achievable using a 
financial conditions index only (see Adrian et al., 2019).  
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Figure 1.Univariate simple quantile regressions 
1-year ahead real GDP growth 3-years ahead real GDP growth 
Credit-to-GDP growth 
  
House prices growth 
  
Current account balance 
  
CLIFS 
  
Note:  The vertical axes represent the annual GDP growth one and three-years ahead. The horizontal axes represent the 
values of the different independent variables. The lower, middle and upper red lines represent the fitted values after 
estimating pooled simple quantile regressions at the 5th, 50th and 95th, respectively.  
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2.2. Macroprudential measures and index 
  
The information on the implemented macroprudential measures in EU countries is collected from 
the recently published ECB Macroprudential Database introduced by Budnik and Kleibl (2018). 
This database contains very granular and detailed information on all the prudential measures 
taken by the 28 EU countries in different categories starting in 1951. This database represents a 
great repository of regulatory information over a long time span, and allows distinguishing 
between macro and microprudential measures, the type of instrument, and its direction, as well 
as detailed descriptions of each measure. Only those measures classified as having at least 
partly a macroprudential objective are retained for this exercise.  
Figure 2. Macroprudential decisions in the EU countries 1970-2018 by category 
 
Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration.  
Note: The horizontal axis represent the number of macroprudential measures implemented by the 28 EU countries 
from 1970 to 2018 in each category, excluding those where the level or scope of the measure remains unchanged. 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the number of macroprudential measures taken by the 28 EU countries 
from 1970 classified by category. This includes tightening and loosening measures but excludes 
decisions where the level or the scope of the instrument remains unchanged. It is observed that 
capital-based measures, which include capital requirements, loan-loss provisions and capital 
buffers, as well as borrower-based measures tackling lending standards, have been the most 
used type of macroprudential policy actions implemented in EU countries. These measures are 
followed by liquidity requirements, limits on credit growth and risk weights. Finally, taxes, limits 
to mismatches on currency and maturity, and limits to concentration have been less 
implemented by EU authorities for macroprudential purposes. The use of macroprudential 
policies has been heterogeneous among countries (Figure A2 in the Annex presents the 
distribution of macroprudential policies by country).  
In order to analyse the use of macroprudential policies, an index that aggregates the different 
types of measures is constructed. In this regard, Cerutti et al. (2017) propose a way to compute 
a macroprudential policy index (MPI) for a large sample of countries. In this study, I follow their 
approach, which consists in a simple sum of the scores on different categories of 
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macroprudential policies for each country. This approach has been followed also by other 
authors aggregating macroprudential measures with minor variations (Boar et al., 2017; Kim and 
Mehrotra, 2018; Duprey and Ueberfeldt, 2018; Alam et al., 2019). The advantage of the index 
constructed in this way compared to the use of dummy variables is that this index allows 
evaluating the effectiveness when more than one measure is in place, and then accounting for 
net tighten or loosen conditions (see Boar et al., 2017, for a discussion). The computation of the 
MPI is as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
9
𝑗𝑗=1 ;  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,   (2) 
where, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the index for country 𝑖𝑖 at quarter 𝑡𝑡, computed as a sum of the scores 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 for each 
category 𝑗𝑗 . In particular, the score of each category adds a value equal to 1 when a 
macroprudential measure is either activated or tightened within the category, while it subtract 1 
when a measure is either deactivated or loosened within that category. If more than one measure 
is tightened or loosened in the same category and in the same quarter, then net sum of the 
measures is added to the score. Likewise other indexes constructed in the literature, the intention 
here is not to capture the intensity of the measures or their change over time, which would imply 
to know how binding each of the measure is in each country and introducing a lot of subjectivity 
that I prefer to avoid.  
 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the minimum, maximum and median values of the MPI in EU 
countries over time. It is observed that before the 90’s, macroprudential policies where not very 
actively used. This situation starts to change during the second half of the 90’s decade and has 
continued increasing, mainly in the last decade, due to the adoption of macroprudential policy 
and new toolkits of instruments in many countries as a consequence of the last financial crisis. 
As it could be expected, most of the policy actions have been tightening measures, but to the 
extent more measures are activated, then loosen policies become a possibility, as it is evidenced 
from the drop in the maximum and minimum values of MPI around the last financial crisis. Figure 
A3 in the Annex presents the number of tightening and loosening macroprudential policies over 
time. 
Figure 3. MPI in the EU over time 
 
Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration. 
Note: The vertical axis represent the value of the MPI computed as in Eq. (1), where a positive value would mean that a 
given country is in a net tighten position, while a negative value imply that the country is in a net loosen position. The 
minimum, median and maximum values in the sample at every quarter from 1970 to 2018 are presented. 
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
9
𝑗𝑗=1 ;  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,   (2) 
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category 𝑗𝑗 . In partic lar, the score of each cat gory adds a v lue equal to 1 when a 
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that I prefer to avoid.  
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countries over time. It is bserved hat before the 90’s, macroprudential policies wher not very 
actively used. This situation star s to change uring the second half of the 90’s decade and has
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extent mo e measures are activated, then loosen policies bec me a possibility, as it is evidenced
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Figure 3. MPI in the EU over time 
 
Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration. 
Note: The vertical axis represent the value of the MPI computed as in Eq. (1), where a positive value would mean that a 
given country is in a net tighten position, while a negative value imply that the country is in a net loosen position. The 
minimum, median and maximum values in the sample at every quarter from 1970 to 2018 are presented. 
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r ti l policies for each country. This a proach has been f llowed also by other 
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PI is as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
9
𝑗𝑗=1 ;  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ∆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,   (2) 
whe e, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the index for country 𝑖𝑖  qua ter 𝑡𝑡, compu ed as a sum f the score  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 for each 
category 𝑗𝑗 . In par icular, the score f ach category adds a value equal to 1 when a 
macroprudential m asure is either activated or tightened within the category, while it subtract 1 
when a measure is eit r deactivated or loosened within that ategory. If more than one measure 
is tightened or loosened in the same category and in the same quarter, then net sum of the 
measures is added to the score. Likewis  other indexes constructed in the literature, the intention 
here is not to capture the intensity of the measures or their change over time, which would imply 
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Figure 3 presents the evolution of the minimum, maximum and median values of the MPI in EU 
countries over time. It is observed that before the 90’s, macroprudential policies where not very 
actively used. This situation starts to change during the second half of the 90’s decade and has 
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A3 in the Annex presents the number of tightening and loosening macroprudential policies over 
time. 
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minimum, median and maximum values in the sample at every quarter from 1970 to 2018 are presented. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Panel quantile regressions 
 
Koenker and Basset (1978) proposed quantile regressions as a useful tool for the identification 
of differential effects on the distribution of a variable of interest instead of focusing on the 
conditional mean, which may mask distributional effects. Since then, the methodology has been 
applied in different fields. In finance the most standard application is the computation of value 
at risk (Jorion, 2001), which is the computation of the expected loss of a portfolio given the 
materialization of an extreme event that may occur with a 5% of probability. In economics, this 
idea is attractive to study the distributional effects over a macroeconomic variable. Cecchetti 
and Li (2008) use this method to study the impact of asset prices on the distribution of inflation 
and GDP growth, while De Niccolo and Lucchetta (2017) identify that this methodology provides 
more accurate forecasts of GDP downside risk than traditional VAR and FAVAR models. More 
related to financial stability the method has been used to assess the impact of systemic risk 
measures over the GDP growth distribution (Giglio et al., 2016; Aikman et al., 2018; Lang et al., 
2019). More recently, Adrian et al. (2019) show that this methodology unmasks heterogeneous 
effects of financial conditions over the GDP growth distribution.  
 
In general, quantile regression models allow accounting for heterogeneous covariates effects, 
while the availability of panel data allow including fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Application of quantile models with fixed effects is straightforward as 
it proceeds in a quantile-by-quantile fashion by allowing for a different fixed effect at each 
quantile (Koenker, 2005). Certainly, unobserved fixed effects can be included as in linear 
regression when T is large with respect to N (Koenker and Geling 2001). The large sample 
properties of these estimates are the same of standard quantile regressions when T is large both 
in absolute terms and relative to N. Thus, the quantile panel fixed effects model is represented 
as follows: 
 
?̂?𝑸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) = ̂𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖?̂?𝜷𝜏𝜏              (3) 
(?̂?𝜷𝜏𝜏, ̂𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏) = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜷𝜷𝜏𝜏
∑ ∑ 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏
𝑇𝑇−ℎ
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 |𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷𝜏𝜏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|            (4) 
𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏 ∙ 𝟏𝟏(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖≥𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝜏𝜏) ∙ 𝟏𝟏(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖<𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)                                       (5)           
 
where, ?̂?𝑸 is the estimated quantile function; 𝜏𝜏 is a given percentile; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable, 
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of individual unobserved effects, 
𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏 are weights that depend on the quantile, and 𝟏𝟏 is an indicator function signaling whether the 
estimated errors are positive or negative. Koenker and Bassett (1978) show that ?̂?𝑸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
is a consistent estimator of the quantile function of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  providing an inverse cumulative 
distribution function. The model is solved as an optimization problem where the weighted sum 
of the absolute value of the residuals is minimized, instead of the squared residuals as in linear 
regression.  
 
However, if T is small relative to N or if T and N are of similar size, estimates of the common 
parameter 𝛽𝛽 may be biased or even under-identified, and an incidental parameters problem may 
arise. Kato et al. (2012) study how the relationship between the size of N and T is key to guarantee 
unbiased and asymptotic estimates in panel quantile regressions with individual effects, finding 
that the main problems arise when T is small. To solve these problems, several methods have 
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been proposed in the literature. Koenker (2004) takes an approach where the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖’s are parameters 
to be jointly estimated with 𝜃𝜃(𝜏𝜏) for q different quantiles. He proposes a penalized estimator that 
correct for the incidental parameters problem. Canay (2011) propose a two-step estimator 
following the idea that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 has a location shift effect on the conditional distribution that is the same 
across quantiles. In the first step the variable of interest is transformed by subtracting an 
estimated fixed effect, by first estimating a panel linear regression of the variable of interest on 
the regressors and averaging over T. The estimator is proved to be consistent and asymptotically 
normal as both N and T grow.3 A related literature has also developed quantile panel data 
methods with correlated random effects (see Graham et al., 2015; Arellano and Bonhomme, 
2016). In general, these estimators do not permit an arbitrary relationship between the treatment 
variables and the individual effects.4 
 
Finally, very recently Machado and Santos Silva (2019) propose the estimation of quantiles via 
moments in order to estimate panel data models with individual effects and models with 
endogenous explanatory variables. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the use of 
methods that are only valid in the estimation of conditional means, while still providing 
information on how the regressors affect the entire conditional distribution. The approach is easy 
to implement even in very large problems and it allows the individual effects to affect the entire 
distribution, rather than being just location shifters.5  
 
3.2. The empirical model 
 
As described above, when T is large in relative terms to N, including additive unobserved fixed 
effects into a panel quantile regression provides consistent estimates. As it is described further 
below, the large sample constructed for this study allows following this approach. Nonetheless, 
in Section 5 we provide some robustness exercises using some of the recent panel quantile 
regression methods described above. The proposed baseline model is the following: 
 
?̂?𝑸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) = ̂𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏 + ?̂?𝛽1𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽2𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽3𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽4𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽5𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
+?̂?𝛽6𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Ǣ  𝜏𝜏 = 5,10, … 90,95;       ℎ = 1, … ,16(6)
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+ℎ is the annualized GDP growth of country i at t+h quarters ahead as defined in Eq. 
(1); 𝑖𝑖  represents the unobserved country-effects; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the contemporaneous GDP annual 
growth rate; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the index of financial stress; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the 2-year average change in the 
credit-to-GDP ratio; 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  is the 2-year average growth in house prices; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  is the current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP;  𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 represents the macroprudential policy index; 
and 𝜏𝜏 represents the 19 estimated quantiles departing from the 5th to the 95th percentiles. 
 
This specification extends the one proposed by Adrian et al. (2019) in two main directions. First, 
it adds three of the most informative mid-term early warning indicators of cyclical systemic risk 
(see Castro et al., 2016; Lang et al., 2019; for empirical testing), which would allow characterizing 
                                                   
3 There is also a related literature on non-separable panel data models. These types of models are flexible enough to 
provide quantile treatment effects, which are partially identified for fixed T (see Graham and Powell, 2012). 
4 Alternatively, Powell (2016) proposes a quantile regression estimator for panel data with non-additive fixed effects that 
accounts for an arbitrary correlation between the fixed effects and instruments. It is one of the few quantile fixed effects 
estimators that provides consistent estimates for small T and for quantile panel data estimators with instrumental 
variables.  
5 In a conditional location-scale model, the information provided by the conditional mean and the conditional scale 
function is equivalent to the information provided by regression quantiles in the sense that these functions completely 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution. This is the result that the authors use to estimate 
quantiles from estimates of the conditional mean and the conditional scale function. 
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distribution function. The model is solved as an optimization problem where the weighted sum 
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parameter 𝛽𝛽 may be biased or even under-identified, and an incidental parameters problem may 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Panel quantile regressions 
 
Koenker and Basset (1978) proposed quantile regressions as a useful tool for the identification 
of differential effects on the distribution of a variable of interest instead f focusing on the 
conditional mean, which may mask distributional effects. Since then, the methodology has been 
applied in different fields. In finance the most standard application is the computation of value 
at risk (Jorion, 2001), which is the computation of the ex ected loss of a portfoli  given the 
materializati n of an extreme event that may occur with a 5% of pr bability. In economics, t is 
idea is attractive to study the distributional effects over a macroeconomic variable. Cecchetti 
and Li (2008) use this method to study the impact of asset prices on the distribution of inflation 
a  GDP growth, while De Nicc lo and Lucchetta (2017) identify that t is methodology provides 
more accurate forecasts of GDP downside risk than traditional VAR and FAVAR models. More 
related to financial stability the method has been used to assess the impact of systemic risk 
measures over the GDP growth distribution (Giglio et al., 2016; Aikman et al., 2018; Lang et al., 
2019). More recently, Adrian et al. (2019) show that this methodology unmasks heterogeneous 
effects of financial conditions over the GDP growth distribution.  
 
In general, quantile regression models allow accounting for heterogeneous covariates effects, 
while the availability of panel data allow including fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Application f quantile models with fixed effects is straightforward as 
it proceeds in a qua tile-by-quantile fashion by allowing for a ifferent fixed effect at each 
quantile (Koenker, 2005). Certai ly, unobserved fixed effects can be inclu ed as in linear 
regression when T is large with respect to N (Koenker and Geling 2001). The large sample 
properties of these estimates are the same f standard quantile regressions when T is large both 
in absolute terms and relative to N. Thus, the quantile panel fixed effects model is represented 
as foll ws: 
 
?̂?𝑸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) = ̂𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖?̂?𝜷𝜏𝜏              (3) 
(?̂?𝜷𝜏𝜏, ̂𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏) = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜷𝜷𝜏𝜏
∑ ∑ 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏
𝑇𝑇−ℎ
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 |𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷𝜏𝜏 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|            (4) 
𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏 ∙ 𝟏𝟏(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖≥𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝜏𝜏) ∙ 𝟏𝟏(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖<𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷+𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)                                       (5)           
 
where, ?̂?𝑸 is the estimated quantile function; 𝜏𝜏 is a given percentile; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable, 
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of individual unobserved effects, 
𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏 are w ights that depend on the quantile, and 𝟏𝟏 is an indicat r function sig aling whether the 
estimated errors re positive or n gative. Koenker and Basse t (1978) show that ?̂?𝑸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
is a consistent estimator of the quantile function of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  providing an inverse cumulative
distribution function. The model is solved as an ptimization problem where th  weighted sum 
of the absolute value of the residuals is minimized, instead of the squared r siduals as in linear 
regression.  
 
However, if T is small relative to N or if T and N are of similar size, estimates of the common 
parameter 𝛽𝛽 may be biased or even under-identified, and an incidental parameters proble  ay 
arise. Kato et al. (2012) stu y how the relationship between the size of N and T is key to guarantee 
unbiased and asymptotic estimates in panel quantile regressions with individual effects, finding 
that the main problems arise when T is small. To solve these problems, several methods have 
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distribution function. The model is solved as an optimization problem where the weighted sum 
of the absolute value of the residuals is minimized, instead of the squared residuals as in linear 
regression.  
 
However, if T is small relative to N or if T and N are of similar size, estimates of the common 
parameter 𝛽𝛽 may be biased or even under-identified, and an incidental parameters problem may 
arise. Kato et al. (2012) study how the relationship between the size of N and T is key to guarantee 
unbiased and asymptotic estimates in panel quantile regressions with individual effects, finding 
that the main problems arise when T is small. To solve these problems, several methods have 
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been proposed in the literature. Koenker (2004) takes an approach where the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖’s are parameters 
to be jointly estimated with 𝜃𝜃(𝜏𝜏) for q different quantiles. He proposes a penalized estimator that 
correct for the incidental parameters problem. Canay (2011) propose a two-step estimator 
following the idea that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 has a location shift effect on the conditional distribution that is the same 
across quantiles. In the first step the variable of interest is transformed by subtracting an 
estimated fixed effect, by first estimating a panel linear regression of the variable of interest on 
the regressors and averaging over T. The estimator is proved to be consistent and asymptotically 
normal as both N and T grow.3 A related literature has also developed quantile panel data 
methods with correlated random effects (see Graham et al., 2015; Arellano and Bonhomme, 
2016). In general, these estimators do not permit an arbitrary relationship between the treatment 
variables and the individual effects.4 
 
Finally, very recently Machado and Santos Silva (2019) propose the estimation of quantiles via 
moments in order to estimate panel data models with individual effects and models with 
endogenous explanatory variables. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the use of 
methods that are only valid in the estimation of conditional means, while still providing 
information on how the regressors affect the entire conditional distribution. The approach is easy 
to implement even in very large problems and it allows the individual effects to affect the entire 
distribution, rather than being just location shifters.5  
 
3.2. The empirical model 
 
As described above, when T is large in relative terms to N, including additive unobserved fixed 
effects into a panel quantile regression provides consistent estimates. As it is described further 
below, the large sample constructed for this study allows following this approach. Nonetheless, 
in Section 5 we provide some robustness exercises using some of the recent panel quantile 
regression methods described above. The proposed baseline model is the following: 
 
?̂?𝑸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) = ̂𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏 + ?̂?𝛽1𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽2𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽3𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽4𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝛽5𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
+?̂?𝛽6𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Ǣ  𝜏𝜏 = 5,10, … 90,95;       ℎ = 1, … ,16(6)
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖+ℎ is the annualized GDP growth of country i at t+h quarters ahead as defined in Eq. 
(1); 𝑖𝑖  represents the unobserved country-effects; 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the contemporaneous GDP annual 
growth rate; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the index of financial stress; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the 2-year average change in the 
credit-to-GDP ratio; 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  is the 2-year average growth in house prices; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  is the current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP;  𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶 represents the macroprudential policy index; 
and 𝜏𝜏 represents the 19 estimated quantiles departing from the 5th to the 95th percentiles. 
 
This specification extends the one proposed by Adrian et al. (2019) in two main directions. First, 
it adds three of the most informative mid-term early warning indicators of cyclical systemic risk 
(see Castro et al., 2016; Lang et al., 2019; for empirical testing), which would allow characterizing 
                                                   
3 There is also a related literature on non-separable panel data models. These types of models are flexible enough to 
provide quantile treatment effects, which are partially identified for fixed T (see Graham and Powell, 2012). 
4 Alternatively, Powell (2016) proposes a quantile regression estimator for panel data with non-additive fixed effects that 
accounts for an arbitrary correlation between the fixed effects and instruments. It is one of the few quantile fixed effects 
estimators that provides consistent estimates for small T and for quantile panel data estimators with instrumental 
variables.  
5 In a conditional location-scale model, the information provided by the conditional mean and the conditional scale 
function is equivalent to the information provided by regression quantiles in the sense that these functions completely 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution. This is the result that the authors use to estimate 
quantiles from estimates of the conditional mean and the conditional scale function. 
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This specification extends the one proposed by Adrian et al. (2019) in two main directions. First, 
it adds three of the most informative mid-term early warning indicators of cyclical systemic risk 
(see Castro et al., 2016; Lang et al., 2019; for empirical testing), which would allow characterizing 
                                                   
3 There is also a related literature n non-s parable panel data models. These types of models are flexible enough to 
provide quantile treatment effects, which are partially identified for fixed T (see Graham and Powell, 2012). 
4 Alternatively, Powell (2016) proposes a quantile regression estimator for panel data with non-additive fixed effects that 
accounts for an arbitrary correlation between the fixed effects and instruments. It is one of the few quantile fixed effects 
estimators that provides consistent estimates for small T and for quantile panel data estimators with instrumental 
variables.  
5 In a conditional location-scale model, the information provided by the conditional mean and the conditional scale 
function is equivalent to the information provided by regression quantiles in the sense that these functions completely 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution. This is the result that the authors use to estimate 
quantiles from estimates of the conditional mean and the conditional scale function. 
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GDP growth at mid-term horizons. In fact, the financial conditions index included by Adrian et 
al. (2019) is only able to explain changes in the conditional GDP growth distribution at horizons 
betw en 1 and 4 quart r  a ead. In this regard, Aikman et al. (2018) have found that early-
warni g cyclical systemic risk indicators p rform well when ssessing mid-term GDP tail ri k. I 
also include the CLIFS, which incorporates more contemporaneous information of systemic risk 
and is intended to characterize the conditional GDP growth distribution at short horizons. 
Seco d, this is a panel specification, which all ws taking advantage of m re information, mainly 
regarding the use of macroprudential policies, while accounting for country-level fixed effects. 
At methodological level, the large number of bserv tions of his sample makes possible to 
include all the variables in the bas li e specification and still obtai  reli ble estimates with low 
and high quantiles. 6 
 
In order to assess the goodness of fit of the models, I compute the pseudo-R2 (?̃?𝑅2) proposed by 
Koenker and Machado (1999). This measure is dependent on the quantile, so it is a local measure 
of fit of the quantile specific regression and differs from the OLS R2. In particular, the measure 
compares the sum of weighted deviations for the model of interest with the same sum from a 
model in which only the intercept appears, and is defined as follows:  
 
?̃?𝑅2(𝜏𝜏) = 1 −
∑ 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+ℎ − ̂𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏) − 𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡?̂?𝜷(𝜏𝜏)
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1 )
∑ 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+ℎ − ̂𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏)
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1 )
 
 
Finally, after obtaining the estimates of the parameters in the panel quantile regressions, 
predictions of the variable of interest 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ can be made for each country at every period. These 
predictions obtained for a given country and period of time can be computed at different 
percentiles 𝜏𝜏. In this application I compute it for 19 percentiles from 0.05 to 0.95 with steps of 
0.05. The predicted values would shape the conditional distribution of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ, allowing to estimate 
a probability density function. However, mapping the estimates of the quantile function into a 
probability density function is not straightforward. There are several methods to recover the 
conditional density. In principle one could obtain it by estimating a large number of quantiles or 
by cubic interpolation. However, these methods may produce non-monotonic conditional 
cumulative distribution functions. Adrian et al. (2019) propose to estimate it parametrically by 
fitting a skewed-t distribution to the predicted values.7 Nonetheless, this method introduces 
strong assumptions on the density function. A non-parametric fit using kernel-based methods 
provides a smooth and monotone cumulative distribution function while allowing for more 
flexibility (Escanciano and Goh, 2014). In particular, I follow the weighted kernel interpolation 
method in Galvez and Mencia (2014).  
 
 
4. Results 
Departing from the baseline specification in Eq. (6), first I assess the performance of different 
specifications by estimating quantile regressions for the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles 
where one explanatory variable is added at a time, starting with the contemporaneous GDP 
growth rate, and then adding the CLIFS index, the credit-to-GDP growth, the house prices 
                                                   
6 A key element is the existence of enough observations above/below the quantile to assure the fit is not an artifact of a 
few extreme observations. Moreover, the asymptotics of quantile regressions rely on there being enough observations 
on both sides in order to accomplish the conditional CLT. A rough rule of thumb is: min{𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏, 𝑛𝑛(1−𝜏𝜏)}≥10𝑝𝑝ǡwhere p is the 
number of explanatory variables (e.g. to estimate the 5th percentile with 5 parameters, the sample size should be greater 
than 1000) (see, Chernozhukov, 2005). 
7 Adrian et al. (2019) prove that fitting the probability density function using a non-parametric approach do not change 
the results.  
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growth, the current account balance and the MPI. These regressions are estimated for GDP 
growth at two different horizons (4 and 12-quarters ahead). Table 2 presents e obtained 
pseudo-R2 for each specification. It is observed that the full specification improves the goodness 
of fit of the model for all quantiles and horizons. However, the marginal added value of including 
different variables varies across quantiles and horizons. In particular, the CLIFS index improves 
the fit of the model at short-horizons but it does not add value for long-horizons. This is 
consistent with the fact that this index is intended to capture conditions of stress in the financial 
sector, which usually increase when risk has already materialized and then are rapidly reflected 
in GDP growth. On the oth r hand, the early-wa ni g variables of cyclical systemic risk ar  mor
useful in explaining GDP growth at longer horizons and mainly characterizing the tails of the 
distribution. This is also expected given that macrofinancial variables related to credit, house 
prices and external imbalances have been proved before to capture properly the build-up of 
systemic risk around three-years before they materialize (see Lang et al., 2019). Overall, the best 
fit in all the cases is at the tails of the GDP growth distribution, and mainly at low quantiles, which 
evidences the importance of moving away from the OLS estimation in order to model properly 
the dynamics of the responses of output to financial cycle movements and the effects of 
macroprudential policies. 
Table 2. Performance of different specifications of quantile regressions of conditional GDP 
growth 4 and 12 quarters ahead 
 h=4 h=12 
 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
GDP 0.103 0.084 0.116 0.167 0.204 0.109 0.084 0.065 0.133 0.161 
CLIFS 0.220 0.119 0.134 0.171 0.211 0.121 0.084 0.065 0.125 0.142 
Credit 0.285 0.125 0.139 0.136 0.282 0.294 0.191 0.116 0.182 0.232 
HP 0.307 0.129 0.142 0.136 0.295 0.336 0.218 0.158 0.201 0.295 
CAB 0.323 0.159 0.144 0.155 0.300 0.389 0.244 0.173 0.247 0.338 
MPI 0.353 0.169 0.162 0.174 0.314 0.430 0.263 0.212 0.260 0.369 
Note: The table presents the value of the pseudo-R2 obtained from quantile estimations of GDP growth 4 and 12 quarters 
ahead at the five percentiles in the second row. Each row represents a regression where the variable in that row is added 
to those in previous rows. Values in bold represent the maximum value of the pseudo –R2 in each row and horizon. 
 
The heterogeneous effects of macrofinancial variables across quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution are evident in Figure 4, where the estimated quantile regression coefficients for these 
variables in the baseline model are plotted along with the 95% confidence bands obtained using 
bootstrapping, and a comparison against the conditional mean estimation provided by an OLS 
model. Results are presented for the conditional GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters 
ahead. Two main general results are observed. First, there are clear differential effects of 
macrofinancial variables on the GDP growth conditional distribution, and second, these effects 
change depending on the time horizon of GDP growth. 
 
In particular, credit imbalances affect negatively the left tail of the GDP growth distribution both 
at short and long horizons. However, in the short-run, the median effect and that on the right tail 
of the GDP growth distribution are barely significant. This indicates that periods of high credit 
growth in relation to GDP, would worsen growth-at-risk in the future and that the economic effect 
is larger in the mid-term. Certainly, the negative impact of these type of imbalances affects the 
entire GDP growth distribution 12 quarters ahead by moving it to the left. Nonetheless, the effect 
on the right tail is about one-third of that on the left tail, indicating that the negative impact is 
concentrated mainly in the downside risk of GDP growth. 
 
11 
 
GDP growth at mid-term horizons. In fact, the financial conditions index included by Adrian et 
al. (2019) is only able to explain changes in the conditional GDP growth distribution at horizons 
between 1 and 4 quarters ahead. In this regard, Aikman et al. (2018) have found that early-
warning cyclical systemic risk indicators perform well when assessing mid-term GDP tail risk. I 
also include the CLIFS, which incorporates more contemporaneous information of systemic risk 
and is intended to characterize the conditional GDP growth distribution at short horizons. 
Second, this is a panel specification, which allows taking advantage of more information, mainly 
regarding the use of macroprudential policies, while accounting for country-level fixed effects. 
At methodological level, the large number of observations of this sample makes possible to 
include all the variables in the baseline specification and still obtain reliable estimates with low 
and high quantiles. 6 
 
In order to assess the goodness of fit of the models, I compute the pseudo-R2 (?̃?𝑅2) proposed by 
Koenker and Machado (1999). This measure is dependent on the quantile, so it is a local measure 
of fit of the quantile specific regression and differs from the OLS R2. In particular, the measure 
compares the sum of weighted deviations for the model of interest with the same sum from a 
model in which only the intercept appears, and is defined as follows:  
 
?̃?𝑅2(𝜏𝜏) = 1 −
∑ 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+ℎ − ̂𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏) − 𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡?̂?𝜷(𝜏𝜏)
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1 )
∑ 𝜌𝜌𝜏𝜏(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+ℎ − ̂𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝜏)
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1 )
 
 
Finally, after obtaining the estimates of the parameters in the panel quantile regressions, 
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a probability density function. However, mapping the estimates of the quantile function into a 
probability density function is not straightforward. There are several methods to recover the 
conditional density. In principle one could obtain it by estimating a large number of quantiles or 
by cubic interpolation. However, these methods may produce non-monotonic conditional 
cumulative distribution functions. Adrian et al. (2019) propose to estimate it parametrically by 
fitting a skewed-t distribution to the predicted values.7 Nonetheless, this method introduces 
strong assumptions on the density function. A non-parametric fit using kernel-based methods 
provides a smooth and monotone cumulative distribution function while allowing for more 
flexibility (Escanciano and Goh, 2014). In particular, I follow the weighted kernel interpolation 
method in Galvez and Mencia (2014).  
 
 
4. Results 
Departing from the baseline specification in Eq. (6), first I assess the performance of different 
specifications by estimating quantile regressions for the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles 
where one explanatory variable is added at a time, starting with the contemporaneous GDP 
growth rate, and then adding the CLIFS index, the credit-to-GDP growth, the house prices 
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growth, the current account balance and the MPI. These regressions are estimated for GDP 
growth at two different horizons (4 and 12-quarters ahead). Table 2 presents the obtained 
pseudo-R2 for each specification. It is observed that the full specification improves the goodness 
of fit of the model for all quantiles and horizons. However, the marginal added value of including 
different variables varies across quantiles and horizons. In particular, the CLIFS index improves 
the fit of the model at short-horizons but it does not add value for long-horizons. This is 
consistent with the fact that this index is intended to capture conditions of stress in the financial 
sector, which usually increase when risk has already materialized and then are rapidly reflected 
in GDP growth. On the other hand, the early-warning variables of cyclical systemic risk are more 
useful in explaining GDP growth at longer horizons and mainly characterizing the tails of the 
distribution. This is also expected given that macrofinancial variables related to credit, house 
prices and external imbalances have been proved before to capture properly the build-up of 
systemic risk around three-years before they materialize (see Lang et al., 2019). Overall, the best 
fit in all the cases is at the tails of the GDP growth distribution, and mainly at low quantiles, which 
evidences the importance of moving away from the OLS estimation in order to model properly 
the dynamics of the responses of output to financial cycle movements and the effects of 
macroprudential policies. 
Table 2. Performance of different specifications of quantile regressions of conditional GDP 
growth 4 and 12 quarters ahead 
 h=4 h=12 
 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
GDP 0.103 0.084 0.116 0.167 0.204 0.109 0.084 0.065 0.133 0.161 
CLIFS 0.220 0.119 0.134 0.171 0.211 0.121 0.084 0.065 0.125 0.142 
Credit 0.285 0.125 0.139 0.136 0.282 0.294 0.191 0.116 0.182 0.232 
HP 0.307 0.129 0.142 0.136 0.295 0.336 0.218 0.158 0.201 0.295 
CAB 0.323 0.159 0.144 0.155 0.300 0.389 0.244 0.173 0.247 0.338 
MPI 0.353 0.169 0.162 0.174 0.314 0.430 0.263 0.212 0.260 0.369 
Note: The table presents the value of the pseudo-R2 obtained from quantile estimations of GDP growth 4 and 12 quarters 
ahead at the five percentiles in the second row. Each row represents a regression where the variable in that row is added 
to those in previous rows. Values in bold represent the maximum value of the pseudo –R2 in each row and horizon. 
 
The heterogeneous effects of macrofinancial variables across quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution are evident in Figure 4, where the estimated quantile regression coefficients for these 
variables in the baseline model are plotted along with the 95% confidence bands obtained using 
bootstrapping, and a comparison against the conditional mean estimation provided by an OLS 
model. Results are presented for the conditional GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters 
ahead. Two main general results are observed. First, there are clear differential effects of 
macrofinancial variables on the GDP growth conditional distribution, and second, these effects 
change depending on the time horizon of GDP growth. 
 
In particular, credit imbalances affect negatively the left tail of the GDP growth distribution both 
at short and long horizons. However, in the short-run, the median effect and that on the right tail 
of the GDP growth distribution are barely significant. This indicates that periods of high credit 
growth in relation to GDP, would worsen growth-at-risk in the future and that the economic effect 
is larger in the mid-term. Certainly, the negative impact of these type of imbalances affects the 
entire GDP growth distribution 12 quarters ahead by moving it to the left. Nonetheless, the effect 
on the right tail is about one-third of that on the left tail, indicating that the negative impact is 
concentrated mainly in the downside risk of GDP growth. 
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Note: The table presents the value of the pseudo-R2 obtained from quantile estimations of GDP growth 4 and 12 quarters 
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The heterogeneous effects of macrofinancial variables across quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution are evident in Figure 4, where the estimated quantile regression coefficients for these 
variables in the baseline model are plotted along with the 95% confidence bands obtained using 
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ahead. Two main general results are observed. First, there are clear differential effects of 
macrofinancial variables on the GDP growth conditional distribution, and second, these effects 
change depending on the time horizon of GDP growth. 
 
In particular, credit imbalances affect negatively the left tail of the GDP growth distribution both 
at short and long horizons. However, in the short-run, the median effect and that on the right tail 
of the GDP growth distribution are barely significant. This indicates that periods of high credit 
growth in relation to GDP, would worsen growth-at-risk in the future and that the economic effect 
is larger in the mid-term. Certainly, the negative impact of these type of imbalances affects the 
entire GDP growth distribution 12 quarters ahead by moving it to the left. Nonetheless, the effect 
on the right tail is about one-third of that on the left tail, indicating that the negative impact is 
concentrated mainly in the downside risk of GDP growth. 
 
12 
 
growth, the current account balance and the MPI. These regressions are estimated for GDP 
growth at two different horizons (4 and 12-quarters ahead). Table 2 presents the obtained 
pseudo-R2 for each specification. It is observed that the full specification improves the goodness 
of fit of the model for all quantiles and horizons. However, the marginal added value of including 
different variables varies across quantiles and horizons. In particular, the CLIFS index improves 
the fit of the model at short-horizons but it does not add value for long-horizons. This is 
consistent with the fact that this index is intended to capture conditions of stress in the financial 
sector, which usually increase when risk has already materialized and then are rapidly reflected 
in GDP gro th. On the other hand, the early-warning variables of cyclical systemic risk are more 
useful in explaining GDP growth at longer horizons and mainly characterizing the tails of the 
distribution. This is also expected given that macrofinancial variables related to credit, house 
prices and external imbalances have been proved before to capture properly the build-up of 
systemic risk around three-years before they materialize (see Lang et al., 2019). Overall, the best 
fit in all the cases is at the tails of the GDP growth distribution, and mainly at low quantiles, which 
evidences the importance of moving away from the OLS estimation in order to model properly 
the dynamics of the responses of output to financial cycle movements and the effects of 
macroprudential policies. 
Table 2. P rformance of different specifications of quantile regressions of conditional GDP 
growth 4 and 12 quarters ahead 
 h=4 h=12 
 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
GDP 0.103 0.084 0.116 0.167 0.204 0.109 0.084 0.065 0.133 0.161 
CLIFS 0.220 0.119 0.134 0.171 0.211 0.121 0.084 0.065 0.125 0.142 
Credit 0.285 0.125 0.139 0.136 0.282 0.294 0.191 0.116 0.182 0.232 
HP 0.307 0.129 0.142 0.136 0.295 0.336 0.218 0.158 0.201 0.295 
CAB 0.323 0.159 0.144 0.155 0.300 0.389 0.244 0.173 0.247 0.338 
MPI 0.353 0.169 0.162 0.174 0.314 0.430 0.263 0.212 0.260 0.369 
Note: The table presents the valu  of the pseudo-R2 obtain d from quantile e timations of GDP growth 4 nd 12 quarters 
ahead at the five percentiles in the second row. Each row represents a regression where the variable in that row is added 
to those in previous rows. Values in bold represent the maximum value of the pseudo –R2 in each row and horizon. 
 
The heterogeneous effects of macrofinancial variables across quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution are evident in Figure 4, where the estimated quantile regression coefficients for these 
variables in the baseline model are plotted along with the 95% confidence bands obtained using 
bootstrapping, and a comparison against the conditional mean estimation provided by an OLS 
model. Results are presented for the conditional GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters 
ahead. Two main general results are observed. First, there are clear differential effects of 
acrofinancial variables on the GDP growth conditional distribution, and second, these effects 
change depending on the time horizon of GDP growth. 
 
In particular, credit imbalances affect negatively the left tail of the GDP growth distribution both 
at short and long horizons. However, in the short-run, the median effect and that on the right tail 
of the GDP growth distribution are barely significant. This indicates that periods of high credit 
growth in relation to GDP, would worsen growth-at-risk in the future and that the economic effect 
is larger in the mid-term. Certainly, the negative impact of these type of imbalances affects the 
entire GDP growth distribution 12 quarters ahead by moving it to the left. Nonetheless, the effect 
on the right tail is about one-third of that on the left tail, indicating that the negative impact is 
concentrated mainly in the downside risk of GDP growth. 
 
12 
 
growth, the current account balance and the MPI. These regressions are s imat d for GDP 
growth at two different horizons (4  12-qu rters ahead). Table 2 presents the btained 
pseudo-R2 f r ach specification. It is observed that th  full specification improves the good ss 
o  fit f the model for all qu ntiles d horizons. However, the marginal added valu  of including 
different variables varies across qua tiles a d h rizo s. In partic lar, the CLIFS index improves 
th  fi  of the model at sh rt-horizons but it oes not add value for long-horizons. This is 
consistent with the fact th t this index is intend d to c pture conditions of stress in the financial 
sector, whic  usually incr ase when risk has lready m terialize  and then are rapidly fle t d 
in GDP growth. On the other hand, the ea ly-warning v riables of cyclical systemic risk ar  more 
useful in explain ng GDP growth at lo ger horizons nd mainly char cterizing the t ils f the 
distribution. This is also exp cted given that macrofi anci l v riabl s lated o credit, house 
prices and exter al imbalance  have be n proved b fore to capture properly the build-up of 
systemic risk around ree-y ars before they materialize (see Lang et al., 2019). Overall, the best 
fit in all the c ses is at th tails f the GDP g wth distribution, d m inly at low quantiles, which 
evide ces the importance of moving away from the OLS estimation in order to mod l properly 
the dynamics of the responses of output to financial cycle movements and the effects of 
macroprudential polici s. 
Table 2. Performanc  of different specifications of quantile regressions of conditional GDP 
growth 4 and 12 quarters ah ad 
 h=4 h=12 
 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
GDP 0.1 3 0.084 0.116 0.167 0.204 0.109 0.084 0.065 0.133 0.161 
CLIFS 0.220 0.119 0.134 0.171 0.211 0.121 0.084 0.0 5 0.1 5 0.142 
Credit 0.285 0.125 0.139 0.136 0.282 0.294 0. 91 0.116 0.182 0.232 
HP 0.307 0.129 0.1 2 0.136 0.295 0.336 0.218 0.158 0.201 0.295 
CAB 0.323 0.159 0.144 0.155 0.300 0. 89 0.244 0. 73 0.247 0.338 
MPI 0.353 0.169 0.162 0.174 0.314 0.430 0.263 0.212 0.260 0.369 
Note: The table presents the value of the pseudo-R2 obtained from quantile estimations of GDP growth 4 and 12 quarters 
ahead at the five percentiles in the second row. Each row represents a regression where the variable in that row is added 
to those in previous rows. Values in bold represent the maximum value of the pseudo –R2 in each row and horizon. 
 
The heterog neous effects of macrofinancial variables across quantiles f the GDP growth 
distributi n ar  evide t in Figure 4, where the estim ted quantile regr ssion coefficients for these 
variables in the baseline model are plotted along w h the 95% confidence bands obtained using 
b otstrapping, nd a comparis n against the conditional mean e imati  provi ed by an OLS 
m del. Results are pr sent d for th conditional GDP growth distribution 4 an  12 quarters 
ahead. Two m in g neral r sults are observe . First, there are clear differen ial ffects of 
macrofinancial variabl s on the GDP gr wth conditional distribution, and second, th s  effects 
change depending on the tim  horizon of GDP growth. 
 
In pa icular, credit imbalances affect negatively the left tail of the GDP growth distribut on both 
at short and l ng horizons. However, in the short-run, t e median effect and that n the right tail 
of the GDP growth distribution are barely significant. This indicates th t periods of high cr dit 
growth i  relation to GDP, w uld worse  growth-at-risk in the future and that the economic effect 
is larger in the mid-te m. Certainly, the negative impact of these type of imbalance  aff cts the 
en ir GDP growth distribution 12 quarters head by movi g it to the lef . Nonetheless, the effect 
 the ight tail s about one-thir  of that on the left ail, indicating that the negative impact is 
concentrated mainly in the downside risk f GDP growth.  
14 
 
 
Similar conclusions arrive from the coefficient of house prices growth regarding the impact on 
the left tail of the GDP growth distribution. That is, periods of high growth of house prices affect
negatively the left tail, and the effect is greater in the mid-term, suggesting that the accumulation 
of cyclical risk related to imbalances of real estate prices would increase growth-at-risk three-
years ahead. On the other hand, the impact on the right tail is positive in the short run, reflecting 
the rapid effect that house prices may have on feeding economic expansions. 
 
Regarding external imbalances, differential effects across the quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution are also found, and these effects are clearer in the mid-term. In particular, a positive 
(negative) current account balance would lead to reduce (increase) the downside risk of GDP. 
That is, periods of deficit of the current account would signal the building-up of imbalances that 
lead to a deeper GDP contraction, although the magnitude of the economic impact on the left 
tail would be similar in the short- and mid-term.  
 
The CLIFS index shows opposite results. That is, an increase in financial stress conditions would 
present more distributional effects on GDP growth in the short-run than in the mid-term, when 
the impact is diluted. This implies that the effect of financial stress is more contemporaneous 
but also that a deterioration of these conditions has a larger impact worsening growth-at-risk 
than on reducing high GDP growth scenarios. These findings are consistent with those identified 
by Aikman et al. (2019b) in the mid-term, who use a measure of equity volatility, and suggest the 
relevance of disentangling contemporaneous variables of financial risk from those capturing the 
building-up of systemic risk. This in contrast to Adrian et al (2019) who mix both type of variables 
in a financial conditions index. 
 
With respect to contemporaneous economic growth, results are more homogeneous across 
quantiles at a 4-quarters horizon, and the estimated effects are positive. This is similar to what 
is documented by Adrian et al. (2019). At a longer horizon, low positive effects are still observed 
in the median and the right tail of the distribution, while no significant effects are identified on 
the left tail (see Figure A4 in the Annex). 
 
4.1. Macroprudential measures 
 
Since the focus this study is not predicting crises but identifying the effects of macroprudential 
policies on the GDP growth conditional distribution, a detailed analysis of the impact of 
macroprudential measures on the conditional GDP growth distribution is presented in this 
subsection. As described in Section 2, the MPI aggregates the implementation of 
macroprudential measures and provides information on the direction of the policies (tightening 
or loosening), while it does not attempt to capture the intensity of the measures.  
 
Figure 5 presents the estimated quantile regression coefficients of the MPI for the conditional 
GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters ahead. Similar to macrofinancial variables, important 
differences in the estimated coefficients of MPI are observed across quantiles, and between 
those estimated for the tails and those from a linear regression. In particular, we observe that 
the greater the MPI the lower the quantile marginal effect on conditional GDP growth. In fact, the 
impact changes from positive in the left tail to negative in the median and the right tail of the 
GDP growth distribution. That is, the more tighten is macroprudential policy the lower is growth-
at-risk but also the lower is the magnitude of high GDP growth scenarios. Thus, macroprudential 
policy would reduce both tails of the conditional GDP growth distribution making it less disperse. 
This is consistent with previous findings by Boar et al., (2017) on the reduction of GDP growth 
volatility after the implementation of macroprudential policies. Differences are also noticed 
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Figure 4. Estimated quantile regression coefficients of macrofinancial variables 
h=4 h=12 
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Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
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Similar conclusions arrive from the coefficient of house prices growth regarding the impact on 
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is documented by Adrian et al. (2019). At a longer horizon, low positive effects are still observed 
in the median and the right tail of the distribution, while no significant effects are identified on 
the left tail (see Figure A4 in the Annex). 
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Since the focus this study is not predicting crises but identifying the effects of macroprudential 
policies on the GDP growth conditional distribution, a detailed analysis of the impact of 
macroprudential measures on the conditional GDP growth distribution is presented in this 
subsection. As described in Section 2, the MPI aggregates the implementation of 
macroprudential measures and provides information on the direction of the policies (tightening 
or loosening), while it does not attempt to capture the intensity of the measures.  
 
Figure 5 presents the estimated quantile regression coefficients of the MPI for the conditional 
GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters ahead. Similar to macrofinancial variables, important 
differences in the estimated coefficients of MPI are observed across quantiles, and between 
those estimated for the tails and those from a linear regression. In particular, we observe that 
the greater the MPI the lower the quantile marginal effect on conditional GDP growth. In fact, the 
impact changes from positive in the left tail to negative in the median and the right tail of the 
GDP growth distribution. That is, the more tighten is macroprudential policy the lower is growth-
at-risk but also the lower is the magnitude of high GDP growth scenarios. Thus, macroprudential 
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depending on the horizon analysed. While the mid-term the effects are larger for the left tail and 
the median of the GDP growth distribution, they remain more stable in the right tail. In terms of 
policy, these results suggest that taking early tightening decisions of macroprudential policies 
would increase the positive impact on reducing downside risk. 
Figure 5. Estimated quantile regression coefficients of MPI 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
 
Importantly, these results unmask the benefits of macroprudential policy on GDP growth, which 
would be concentrated in the left tail of the distribution. This benefit could be related to an 
increase in the resilience of the financial system leading to a reduction of downside risk. This is 
a very relevant result since previous literature assessing the impact of macroprudential policies 
on GDP growth have identified negative effects, mainly in the short-run, which are associated to 
the costs of these policies (Kim and Mehrotra, 2018; Richter et al., 2018). Those studies assess 
the impact of macroprudential policy through models that focus on the conditional mean, which 
is consistent with the results obtained through quantile regressions estimated for the median 
and with OLS regressions.  
 
These findings suggest the need of studying more in detail the effects on the left tail and the 
median of the GDP growth distribution over time, which can be interpreted as benefits and costs 
of macroprudential policy. This is explored below.  
 
4.2.1. The term structure of macroprudential policies 
 
As it was observed above, the impact of macroprudential policies on GDP growth differs across 
quantiles and between the short-run and the mid-term. Interpreting, the positive effects in low 
quantiles of the GDP growth distribution as benefits and the negative effects in the median as 
costs would allow analysing the term structure of costs and benefits of the implementation of 
macroprudential policies. To explore this, I extend the estimations of the 5th, and 50th percentiles 
to horizons of GDP growth from 1 to 16 quarters ahead in steps of one quarter in order to obtain 
the impulse-response of macroprudential policies. Figure 6 plots the evolution over time of the 
impact of tightening a macroprudential measure as captured by the MPI on the mentioned GDP 
growth percentiles, including the corresponding 95% confidence bands estimated using 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
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As it was observed above, the impact of macroprudential policies on GDP growth differs across 
quantiles and between the short-run and the mid-term. Interpreting, the positive effects in low 
quantiles of the GDP growth distribution as benefits and the negative effects in the median as 
costs would allow analysing the term structure of costs and benefits of the implementation of 
macroprudential policies. To explore this, I extend the estimations of the 5th, and 50th percentiles 
to horizons of GDP growth from 1 to 16 quarters ahead in steps of one quarter in order to obtain 
the impulse-response of macroprudential policies. Figure 6 plots the evolution over time of the 
impact of tightening a macroprudential measure as captured by the MPI on the mentioned GDP 
growth percentiles, including the corresponding 95% confidence bands estimated using 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
It is observed that the positive effects on growth-at-risk start to be significant around 3 quarters 
after tightening macroprudential policy and that these effects last for almost three years, 
reaching a maximum impact around two years after the implementation. The estimated 
economic effect suggests that the increase in the magnitude of GDP growth occurring with a 
probability of 5% would reach around 2pp. On the other hand, the negative effect on the median 
Figure 5. Estimated quantile regression coefficients of MPI 
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
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Importantly, these results unmask the benefits of macroprudential policy on GDP growth, which 
would be concentrated in the left tail of the distribution. This benefit could be related to an 
increase in the resilience of the financial system leading to a reduction of downside risk. This is 
a very relevant result since previous literature assessing the impact of macroprudential policies 
on GDP growth have identified negative effects, mainly in the short-run, which are associated to 
the costs of these policies (Kim and Mehrotra, 2018; Richter et al., 2018). Those studies assess 
the impact of macroprudential policy through models that focus on the conditional mean, which 
is consistent with the results obtained through quantile regressions estimated for the median 
and with OLS regressions.  
 
These findings suggest the need of studying more in detail the effects on the left tail and the 
median of the GDP growth distribution over time, which can be interpreted as benefits and costs 
of macroprudential policy. This is explored below.  
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So far, I have assumed that the effects of macroprudential policies over the GDP growth 
distribution remain unchanged across the financial cycle, which also lead to interpret that the 
impact of loosening macroprudential policies would be opposite and symmetric to the impact of 
tightening policies. Nonetheless, in practice national authorities would tight macroprudential 
instruments when systemic risk is being accumulated, which is usually observed during 
expansionary stages of the financial cycle. On the other hand, during contractionary stages of 
the cycle macroprudential authorities would like to loosen or deactivate measures, which might 
have different economic effects over the GDP growth distribution and over time.  
Certainly, previous studies have found that the timing of macroprudential policies is relevant and 
may produce differential effects depending on the stage of the financial cycle. Jiménez et al. 
(2016) find that cumulating capital buffers during credit expansions reduce the magnitude of 
bank credit contractions during systemic crises, but that it magnifies the negative effects on 
Notes: The blue and red lines represent the estimated coefficients of the MPI on quantile regression at the 5th and 50th 
percentiles on the conditional GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. The dotted lines represent the 95% 
confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
Figure 6. Estimated quantile regression coefficients of MPI on the 5th and 50th percentiles of the 
GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. 
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credit and firm’s probability of survivor if they are cumulated during a downward phase of the 
cycle.  Also, in an analysis of borrower-based measures, Claessens et al. (2013) and Cerutti et 
al. (2017) have identified that these measures are more effective during booms than in bust 
periods.  
of the GDP growth distribution would become significant just one quarter after the policy is 
activated. Nonetheless, the economic effect is of lower magnitude and less persistent over time. 
The reduction in the median GDP growth would represent maximum 1pp around 1 year after the 
implementation of the policy action and it would dilute 2 years after the implementation. This is 
consistent with the magnitude and duration of the estimated negative impact of macroprudential 
policies on the conditional mean GDP growth in previous studies (Kim and Mehrotra, 2018).  
In general, the positive effects on the left tail of the distribution are larger than the negative effects 
on the median at every time horizon. This suggests a net benefit of implementing 
macroprudential policies, but that this benefit may take some time to materialize. In terms of 
policy implementation, these results indicate that macroprudential authorities need to anticipate 
their decisions on the activation or tightening of macroprudential policies in order to effectively 
reduce growth-at-risk and compensate the mean reductions.  
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It is observed that the estimated coefficient of MPI is lower than the one estimated above, and 
even not significant for the median and the left tail of the distribution in the short-term. However, 
at a longer horizon (12 quarters ahead), the impact would be positive although lower than the 
one presented in Figure 6 (around 1pp for the 5th percentile). This would imply that tightening 
macroprudential policies during normal times or expansionary periods might have a longer delay 
in becoming effective on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth.  
Regarding the interaction term, it has a negative and significant impact along the GDP growth 
distribution in a 4 quarters horizon, though the effect is larger in the low quantiles. In the mid-
term, the effect on the left tail of the distribution remains almost unchanged, while it becomes 
positive for high quantiles. These results imply that the stage of the financial cycle plays an 
important role on the economic impact of macroprudential policy. 
In order to disentangle these effects, I include a variable identifying periods of systemic crises 
and its interaction with macroprudential policy into the baseline model. Systemic crises periods 
are those identified by national authorities of the 28 EU countries as systemic events relevant 
from a macroprudential perspective in the ECB/ESRB crises database published in Lo Duca et 
al. (2017). The results obtained for the coefficients of MPI and its interaction with systemic crises 
are presented in Figure 7 for GDP growth 4 and 12 quarters ahead.  
Figure 7. Estimated quantile regression coefficients of MPI and its interaction with crises on the 
conditional GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters ahead. 
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
h=4 h=12 
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8 Figure A5 in the Annex presents the impulse response of the 5th and 50th percentiles of GDP growth up to 16 quarters 
ahead after tightening policies during non-crises periods and loosening policies during busts. An advantage of this 
specification is that it allows non-symmetric effects of tightening and loosening decisions during the same stage of the 
cycle. However, some drawbacks include that the number of loosening decisions is limited and that the dummy variables 
do not cumulate previous decisions as the MPI does. Thus, it does not allow to evaluate the effectiveness when more 
than one measure is in place, and the net tighten or loosen conditions (Boar et al., 2017).  
9 The MPI adds up 1 if a measure is tightened and subtract 1 in the case of loosening a macroprudential measure. 
In particular, during a systemic crisis there is a significant positive effect of loosening 
macroprudential policy (reduction in the MPI), which would affect specially the left tail of the GDP 
growth distribution. Thus, the total effect of loosening a macroprudential instrument during 
financial crises periods is positive in terms of reducing growth-at risk and these benefits are 
observable in the short-run, while they dilute in the mid-term (sum of both coefficients around 
zero for h=12). On the other hand, this would imply that tightening macroprudential policies 
during crises would have a negative effect mainly evident on the tails of the distribution. In fact, 
macroprudential policies are intended to be put on place during expansionary phases of the 
financial cycle, when cyclical systemic risks is built-up; while during contractionary phases, 
macroprudential policies are supposed to be deactivated or loosened. These results are found 
to be robust to an alternative specification where tightening and loosening measures are 
separated into two dummy variables flagging each of the decisions and interacted with the crises 
variable.8  
To illustrate these effects along the distribution, I map the estimates of the quantile function 
obtained with the model adding the interaction with crises periods into a probability density 
function by using the Kernel-based method described in Section 3.2. This allows predicting the 
effect of tightening and loosening macroprudential policy in the two different stages of the cycle. 
Figure 8 presents the fitted distributions for the conditional GDP growth distribution 4 and 12-
quarters ahead during crises and non-crises periods and compare them with the predicted 
distributions assuming that macroprudential policy is tightened or loosened by one measure.9  
In the left panel, it is observed that introducing a tightening policy during normal times or 
expansionary phases would reduce both tails of the conditional GDP growth distribution 
producing a less disperse and more symmetric distribution, which is more evident at longer 
horizons. In particular, the positive effect on the left tail would be related to an increase of 
resilience, while potential effects on smoothing the cycle might explain the negative impact on 
the right tail. On the other hand, the right panel shows the effects of loosening macroprudential 
policies during crises periods, when it is observed that both tails of the distribution move to the 
right, both reducing downside risk and increasing the magnitude of potential expansions. In this 
case, these effects are more evident in the short-run and tend to dilute 12 quarters ahead, mainly 
for the left tail.   
These findings support that the effects of macroprudential policy on the conditional GDP growth 
distribution are heterogeneous through the cycle and that the direction of policy in terms of 
tightening and loosening might have both positive and negative effects on downside risk 
depending on the position in the financial cycle. Nonetheless, the term structure seems again to 
play an important role on the impact of tightening and loosening policies. 
Certainly, when macroprudential instruments are tightened, this is usually a gradual process and 
its implementation may take different stages. On the contrary, when macroprudential policy is 
loosened, it is usually a fast process implemented in few steps. The reason is that tightening 
macroprudential policy occurs to the extent systemic risk vulnerabilities are confirmed and 
reflected by the indicators, thereby they can be distributed along the expansionary phase of the 
cycle. On the other hand, crises materialize quickly forcing loosening decisions to be taken 
rapidly. Moreover, the characteristics of expansionary and contractionary phases of the cycle 
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Differential effects of the direction of macroprudential policy and over the cycle on the GDP 
growth distribution were disentangled above. However, the definition of macroprudential policy 
used is an aggregation of very different types of instruments, which might have different effects 
on real economy. While capital measures act indirectly through an improvement in solvency 
conditions of banks, thereby increasing the resilience of the banking sector; borrower-based 
measures act directly by assuring that lending at its origination accomplishes minimum 
standards, thereby limiting risk-taking.  
Certainly, borrower-based and capital measures are, by far, the most used types of instruments 
by EU countries (see Figure 2). This is also why most of studies assessing the impact of 
macroprudential policies have focused on these two types of measures. In general, studies on 
Figure 8. Conditional GDP growth distribution 4 and 12 quarters ahead of the implementation of 
tightening/loosening macroprudential policies over the cycle. 
Note: The figures present the estimated GDP growth distributions at horizons equal to 4 and 12 quarters ahead, after 
mapping the fitted values of the quantile functions obtained with the model adding the interaction with crises into a 
probability density function by using the Kernel-based method described in Section 3.2. The black densities represent 
the fitted values filtering by crises and non-crises periods, while the red densities represent the counterfactual assuming 
that macroprudential policy is tightened or loosened in one measure for all countries. 
Tightening during non-crises periods Loosening during crises 
h=4 
 
h=12 
are different affecting also the effectiveness of the measures and the time they last to have real 
effects.  
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smoothing the cycle may explain the negative impact, which is in fact a secondary objective of 
countercyclical capital buffers. 
Figure 9. Impulse response of tightening and loosening different macroprudential instruments 
over the cycle at different horizons (5th, 50th and 95th percentiles) 
Tightening during non-crises periods Loosening during crises periods 
Capital measures 
  
Borrower-based measures 
  
Notes: The blue and red lines represent the estimated coefficients of the MPI on quantile regression at the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentiles on the conditional GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. The dotted lines represent the 
95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
 
On the other hand, when these measures are loosened during busts, the benefits are more 
immediate and larger. The estimated effect would reach an increase of around 1.5pp in growth-
at-risk and this benefit would materialize during the first year after releasing or loosening capital 
measures. These results are consistent with previous literature. Jiménez et al. (2017) identify 
that, while the impact of a 1pp increase in capital buffers on credit growth would reach a 6pp 
reduction over expansionary phases, the impact of releasing the same amount of capital during 
busts would imply a 9pp lower reduction in credit growth. The authors identify similar non-
linearities in terms of the probability of survivor of firms and employment. Interestingly, 
loosening/releasing capital measures during crises would have a positive impact on the median 
and the right tail of the GDP growth distribution at longer horizons, which might be associated 
with a stronger recovery of GDP after crises. 
Similarly to capital instruments, tightening borrower-based measures during non-crisis periods 
has relevant differential effects on the left tail of the GDP growth distribution with respect to the 
impact on the median and the right tail. However, tightening this type of measures would have a 
more immediate positive impact on the downside risk of GDP growth and its effects would last 
for longer. In particular, restricting lending standards implies an increase of around 1.2pp on 
growth-at-risk just three quarters after the implementation of such measures, and the positive 
effect would last for up to 3 years. These benefits seem to be larger than the costs associated 
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Differential effects of the direction of macroprudential policy and over the cycle on the GDP 
growth distribution were disentangled above. However, the definition of macroprudential policy 
used is an aggregation of very different types of instruments, which might have different effects 
on real economy. While capital measures act indirectly through an improvement in solvency 
conditions of banks, thereby increasing the resilience of the banking sector; borrower-based 
measures act directly by assuring that lending at its origination accomplishes minimum 
standards, thereby limiting risk-taking.  
Certainly, borrower-based and capital measures are, by far, the most used types of instruments 
by EU countries (see Figure 2). This is also why most of studies assessing the impact of 
macroprudential policies have focused on these two types of measures. In general, studies on 
capital measures have evidenced important differences in the effects of these instruments over 
the cycle (see Jiménez et al., 2017). In general, these effects have been identified to be negative 
on credit growth during upswings but positive during downturns. Regarding borrower-based 
measures, these instruments have been found to effectively curve house prices and households 
credit growth. These measures have also been identified to have different effects over the cycle. 
Claessens et al. (2013) and Cerutti et al. (2017) find that these measures are more effective during 
expansionary phases of the cycle. In this regard, Poghosyan (2019) identify that the effects of 
tightening borrower-based measures during booming periods takes more time to become 
effective compared to their loosening during busts.  
To study the potential different effects from these two types of instruments, I split the MPI into 
three indexes. The first two indexes are the scores 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 defined in Eq. (2) for the categories of 
borrower-based and capital measures. In the first case it includes capital requirements, capital 
buffers and loan provisions, while in the second case it encompasses all measures tied to lending 
standards such as caps on ratios of loan-to-value, loan-to-income, loan service-to-income, loan 
terms and other restrictions linked to borrower’s characteristics. The third index encompasses 
all the rest of measures, which would control for potential misidentification of effect of other type 
of measures placed simultaneously. All three indexes are interacted with the crisis dummy 
variable in order to account for the effects of the cycle. The regressions are estimated for each 
of the GDP growth horizons from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. 
Figure 9 presents the marginal effects of both types of measures on the GDP growth distribution 
over different horizons distinguishing by the direction of the policy (tightening and loosening) and 
the stage of the financial cycle (crises and non-crises periods). This would provide the impulse-
response of macroprudential policies in these categories. In particular, the effects on the 5th, 50th 
and 95th percentiles are presented. As it was previously identified using the aggregate MPI, 
important differences in the impact of these specific policies across quantiles are observed. In 
general, the impact on growth-at-risk is different from those estimated for the median and the 
right tail, which are closer among them. The effects on the left tail are always positive when 
significant, while those on the median and the right tail are mostly negative, mainly when these 
measures are tightened during normal or expansionary periods. Nonetheless, important 
differences are also observed in the response of the quantiles of GDP growth over time. 
In particular, tightening capital measures during non-crises periods has a positive impact on the 
downside risk of GDP growth but this benefit takes more than 2 years in becoming evident. The 
economic impact would reach an increase of up to 1pp of growth-at-risk over this period. This 
suggests that tightening capital measures would be beneficial in terms of lowering downside risk 
only if these measures are implemented early enough. Regarding the right tail, effects related to 
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smoothi g the cycle may explain the negative impact, which is in fact a s c n ary objective of 
countercyclical capital buffers. 
Figure 9. Impulse response of tightening and loosening different macroprudential instruments 
over the cycle at different horizons (5th, 50th and 95th percentiles) 
Tightening during non-crises periods Loosening during crises periods 
Capital measures 
  
Borrower-based measures 
  
Notes: The blue and red lines represent the estimated coefficients of the MPI on quantile regression at the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentiles on the conditional GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. The dotted lines represent the 
95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
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important differences in the impact of these specific policies across quantiles are observed. In 
general, the impact on growth-at-risk is different from those estimated for the median and the 
right tail, which are closer among them. The effects on the left tail are always positive when 
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smoothing the cycle may explain the negative impact, which is in fact a secondary objective of 
countercyclical capital buffers. 
Figure 9. Impulse response of tightening and loosening different macroprudential instruments 
over the cycle at different horizons (5th, 50th and 95th percentiles) 
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Notes: The blue and red lines represent the estimated coefficients of the MPI on quantile regression at the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentiles on the conditional GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. The dotted lines represent the 
95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
 
On the other hand, when these measures are loosened during busts, the benefits are more 
immediate and larger. The estimated effect would reach an increase of around 1.5pp in growth-
at-risk and this benefit would materialize during the first year after releasing or loosening capital 
measures. These results are consistent with previous literature. Jiménez et al. (2017) identify 
that, while the impact of a 1pp increase in capital buffers on credit growth would reach a 6pp 
reduction over expansionary phases, the impact of releasing the same amount of capital during 
busts would imply a 9pp lower reduction in credit growth. The authors identify similar non-
linearities in terms of the probability of survivor of firms and employment. Interestingly, 
loosening/releasing capital measures during crises would have a positive impact on the median 
and the right tail of the GDP growth distribution at longer horizons, which might be associated 
with a stronger recovery of GDP after crises. 
Similarly to capital instruments, tightening borrower-based measures during non-crisis periods 
has relevant differential effects on the left tail of the GDP growth distribution with respect to the 
impact on the median and the right tail. However, tightening this type of measures would have a 
more immediate positive impact on the downside risk of GDP growth and its effects would last 
for longer. In particular, restricting lending standards implies an increase of around 1.2pp on 
growth-at-risk just three quarters after the implementation of such measures, and the positive 
effect would last for up to 3 years. These benefits seem to be larger than the costs associated 
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to the estimated reduction on the median GDP growth. On the other hand, the impact of 
loosening borrower-based measures during systemic crises is more limited. It would have a 
positive impact of less than 0.5pp on growth-at-risk around two years after its implementation. 
Interestingly, in this case, there is not a clear difference between the effect in left and the right 
tails of the distribution, which seem to be affected in a similar way, while the impact on the 
median growth would be negligible. 
 
These results corroborate some previous findings on the differential effects of the effectiveness 
of borrower-based measures over the cycle. Although previous approaches estimate conditional 
mean effects and focus mostly on the impact on credit and house prices, those studies have 
found large effects when these measures are tightened during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
and a low impact when they are loosened during contractionary phases. Claessens et al. (2013) 
and Cerutti, et al. (2017) document this heterogeneous impact on credit and house prices 
growth, while Galán and Lamas (2019) identify these differences in terms of default risk of 
mortgages. Poghosyan (2019) also identifies differences in the time these measures take to 
become effective depending on the direction of the policy and the position in the cycle. 
 
Overall, these results have important policy implications. Although, both types of measures are 
effective on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
the identified impact delay suggests that capital measures should be implemented promptly and 
earlier than borrower-based measures, whose benefits can be perceived more rapidly. During 
downturns, the benefits of loosening capital requirements or releasing capital buffers on 
reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are important and more immediate, while the benefits 
of loosening borrower-based measures are more limited. Certainly, given that risks materialize 
rapidly during crises, macroprudential authorities have incentives to release capital buffers 
suddenly with rapid effects on improving the banking sector resilience. On the other hand, it is 
very likely that loosening borrower-based measures during busts would not be binding given 
that the unfavourable macrofinancial environment incentivise banks to self-regulate by tightening 
their credit conditions. 
 
5. Robustness 
 
5.1. Endogeneity of macroprudential measures 
5.1.1. Macroprudential measures from international regulation 
A concern that may arise with the inclusion of macroprudential policy in the models is that it is 
potentially endogenous to future GDP growth. That is, although financial and business cycles 
have been identified to have different lengths (Claessens et al., 2012; Galati et al., 2016) and 
macroprudential policies are intended to respond to the former, macroprudential authorities may 
take decisions on these instruments using prospective information and expectations on the 
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dependent on those expectations, arising an endogeneity problem. In order to avoid this 
potential bias introduced in the results above, I include an alternative MPI built only on strictly 
exogenous measures. For that purpose, I keep only macroprudential measures reported in the 
database as coming from transpositions of international regulation. Figure A6 in the Annex 
presents a comparison of macroprudential measures based on national and international 
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smoothing the cycle may explain the negative impact, which is in fact a secondary objective of 
countercyclical capital buffers. 
Figure 9. Impulse response of tightening and loosening different macroprudential instruments 
over the cycle at different horizons (5th, 50th and 95th percentiles) 
Tightening during non-crises periods Loosening during crises periods 
Capital measures 
  
Borrower-based measures 
  
Notes: The blue and red lines repres nt the estimated coefficients of the MPI on quantile regression at the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentiles on the conditional GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. The dotted lines represent the 
95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
 
On the other hand, when these measures are loosened during busts, the benefits are more 
immediate and larger. The estimated effect would reach an increase of around 1.5pp in growth-
at-risk and this benefit would materialize during the first year after releasing or loosening capital 
measures. These results are consistent with previous literature. Jiménez et al. (2017) identify 
that, while the impact of a 1pp increase in capital buffers on credit growth would reach a 6pp 
reduction over expansionary phases, the impact of releasing the same amount of capital during 
busts would imply a 9pp lower reduction in credit growth. The authors identify similar non-
linearities in terms of the probability of survivor of firms and employment. Interestingly, 
loosening/releasing capital measures during crises would have a positive impact on the median 
and the right tail of the GDP growth distribution at longer horizons, which might be associated 
with a stronger recovery of GDP after crises. 
Simil rly t  capital instrum nts, tightening borrower-based measures during non-crisis periods 
has relevant differential effects on the left tail of the GDP growth distribution with respect to the 
impact on the median nd the right tail. However, tigh ening this type of measures would hav  a
more immediate positive impact on the downside risk of GDP growth and its effects would last
for longer. In particular, restricting lending standards implies an increase of around 1.2pp on
growth-at-risk just thr e quarters fter the implementation of such measures, and the positive
effect would last for up o 3 years. These benefits seem  be larger than th  costs associated
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immediate and larger. The estimated effect would reach an increase of around 1.5pp in growth-
at-risk and this benefit would materialize during the first year after releasing or loosening capital 
measures. These results are consistent with previous literature. Jiménez et al. (2017) identify 
that, while the impact of a 1pp increase in capital buffers on credit growth would reach a 6pp 
reduction over expansionary phases, the impact of releasing the same amount of capital during 
busts would imply a 9pp lower reduction in credit growth. The authors identify similar non-
linearities in terms of the probability of survivor of firms and employment. Interestingly, 
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with a stronger recovery of GDP after crises. 
Similarly to capital instruments, tightening borrower-based measures during non-crisis periods 
has relevant differential effects on the left tail of the GDP growth distribution with respect to the 
impact on the median and the right tail. However, tightening this type of measures would have a 
more immediate positive impact on the downside risk of GDP growth and its effects would last 
for longer. In particular, restricting lending standards implies an increase of around 1.2pp on 
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to the estimated reduction on the median GDP growth. On the other hand, the impact of 
loosening borrower-based measures during systemic crises is more limited. It would have a 
positive impact of less than 0.5pp on growth-at-risk around two years after its implementation. 
Interestingly, in this case, there is not a clear difference between the effect in left and the right 
tails of the distribution, which seem to be affected in a similar way, while the impact on the 
median growth would be negligible. 
 
These results corroborate some previous findings on the differential effects of the effectiveness 
of borrower-based measures over the cycle. Although previous approaches estimate conditional 
mean effects and focus mostly on the impact on credit and house prices, those studies have 
found large effects when these measures are tightened during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
and a low impact when they are loosened during contractionary phases. Claessens et al. (2013) 
and Cerutti, et al. (2017) document this heterogeneous impact on credit and house prices 
growth, while Galán and Lamas (2019) identify these differences in terms of default risk of 
mortgages. Poghosyan (2019) also identifies differences in the time these measures take to 
become effective depending on the direction of the policy and the position in the cycle. 
 
Overall, these results have important policy implications. Although, both types of measures are 
effective on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
the identified impact delay suggests that capital measures should be implemented promptly and 
earlier than borrower-based measures, whose benefits can be perceived more rapidly. During 
downturns, the benefits of loosening capital requirements or releasing capital buffers on 
reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are important and more immediate, while the benefits 
of loosening borrower-based measures are more limited. Certainly, given that risks materialize 
rapidly during crises, macroprudential authorities have incentives to release capital buffers 
suddenly with rapid effects on improving the banking sector resilience. On the other hand, it is 
very likely that loosening borrower-based measures during busts would not be binding given 
that the unfavourable macrofinancial environment incentivise banks to self-regulate by tightening 
their credit conditions. 
 
5. Robustness 
 
5.1. Endogeneity of macroprudential measures 
5.1.1. Macroprudential measures from international regulation 
A concern that may arise with the inclusion of macroprudential policy in the models is that it is 
potentially endogenous to future GDP growth. That is, although financial and business cycles 
have been identified to have different lengths (Claessens et al., 2012; Galati et al., 2016) and 
macroprudential policies are intended to respond to the former, macroprudential authorities may 
take decisions on these instruments using prospective information and expectations on the 
business cycle. In this context, macroprudential measures taken by national authorities might be 
dependent on those expectations, arising an endogeneity problem. In order to avoid this 
potential bias introduced in the results above, I include an alternative MPI built only on strictly 
exogenous measures. For that purpose, I keep only macroprudential measures reported in the 
database as coming from transpositions of international regulation. Figure A6 in the Annex 
presents a comparison of macroprudential measures based on national and international 
regulation. 
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Results of the quantile estimations at GDP growth horizons equal to 4 and 12 quarters are 
presented in Figure 10, where the previous MPI is replaced by the new version including only 
international regulation-based measures (MPI*). Results of the quantile estimates at both 
horizons are very similar to those reported for the original MPI above. In particular, the effect is 
positive in the 5th percentile while it is negative in the right tail of the GDP growth distribution. 
The positive impact is more evident at the longer horizon and the economic estimated effect is 
of similar magnitude. Nonetheless, the impact on the median is not significant. Interpreting these 
results in terms of costs and benefits suggests a larger net benefit. Overall, using only exogenous 
macroprudential decisions, previous results hold and seem robust to this more strict definition. 
Figure 10. Quantile estimates of the alternative macroprudential policy index based on 
international regulation (MPI*) at different horizons. 
h=4 
 
h=12 
 
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
 
5.1.2. Non-systematic macroprudential measures 
Another way to isolate potential endogeneity concerns could be splitting macroprudential 
measures into their systematic and non-systematic components. Boar et al. (2017) propose a 
way to separate macroprudential policy into these two components based on what has been 
previously attempted for monetary policy in terms of residuals of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) or 
for fiscal policy in terms of residuals of fiscal rules linked to GDP changes (Fatás and Mihov, 
2012). The authors propose to regress a macroprudential index, which is constructed in a very 
similar to the one used in this study, on the most common variables considered for taking 
macroprudential policy decisions, including credit-to-GDP growth and output growth. Therefore, 
following Boar et al. (2017) I replace the original MPI with the residuals (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of a fixed effects 
regression of the MPI on the rest of variables in the baseline specification in Eq. (6) as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3)
Figure 11 presents the quantile estimates for the non-systematic component of MPI at the two 
main GDP growth horizons analysed above. It is observed that the heterogeneous effects and 
their estimated magnitudes across quantiles are very similar to those obtained using the original 
MPI proposed above. This would imply that the impact of macroprudential policy on the GDP 
growth distribution is robust to accounting for only non-systematic decisions, thereby alleviating 
endogeneity concerns regarding factors associated to systematic macroprudential decisions in 
the exercises performed above. 
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t  the estimated reduction on the median GDP growth. On the other hand, the impact of 
loosening borrower-based measures during systemic crises is more limited. It would h ve a 
positive impact of less than 0.5pp on growth-at-risk around two years after its implementation. 
Interestingly, in this case, there is not a cl ar difference between the effect in left and the right 
tails of the distribution, which se m to be affected in a similar way, while the impact on the 
median growth would be negligible. 
 
These results corroborate some previous findings on the differential effect  of the ffectiveness 
of borrower-b sed measure  over the cycle. Although previous approach  estimate conditional 
mean effects and focus mo tly on the impact on credit a d house prices, t o  studi s have 
found large effe ts when these mea ures are tightened during ex an ionary phase  of the cycle, 
 a low impact when they are loosened during co tractionary phases. Claessens et al. (2013) 
and Cerutti, et l. (2017) document this heterogeneous impa t on credit and house prices 
gr wth, while Galán and Lamas (2019) id ntify th se differences in terms of default risk of 
mortgag s. Poghosyan (2019) also id ntifies diff rences i  the time these m asures take to 
become effective depending on the direction of the policy and the position in the cycle. 
 
Ov rall, thes  results ave important policy implications. Although, b th t pes of measures are 
effective on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
the identified impact delay suggests that capital measures should be implemented romptly a d 
earlier than borrower-based measures, whose b nefits ca  be perc ived more r pidly. During 
downturns, the benefits of loosening capital requirements r releasing capital buff rs on 
reducing the d wnside risk of GDP growth are important and more immediate, while the b nefits 
of loosening borrower-based measures re mor  limited. Certainly, given that risks materialize 
rapi ly during crises, macr prudential authorities hav  incentiv s to release capital buffer  
suddenly with rapid effects n improving the banking sector re ilience. On the other hand, it is 
very likely that loos ning borrower-based measures during ust  would not be binding given 
t at the unfavourable macrofinancial environment incentivise banks to self-regulate by tightening 
their credit conditions. 
 
5. Robustness 
 
5.1. Endogeneity of macroprudential measures 
5.1.1. Macroprudential measures from international regulation 
A co cern that may arise with the inclusi n of macroprudential policy in the models is that it i  
pot ntially endogenous to future GDP growth. Th t i , although financial and business cycles 
have been identified to have differ nt lengths (Claessens et al., 2012; Gala i et al., 2016) and 
macroprude tial policies are intended to respond to the forme , macroprudential au horities may 
take decisions on these instru ents using prospectiv  information and expecta ions on th  
business cycle. In this context, macrop udential measur s taken by national authorities might be 
dependent on th se xpectation , arising an endogeneity problem. In order to avoid this 
potential bias introduced in the result  abov , I i clude an alterna ive MPI built only on strictly 
exogenous measures. For that purpose, I keep only macroprudential measures report d i  the 
database s coming from transp sitions of int rnational regulation. Figure A6 in he Annex 
presents a comparison of macroprudential measures based on national and international 
regulation. 
 
22
 
to the estimated reduction on the median GDP growth. On the other hand, the impact of 
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and Cerutti, et al. (2017) document this heterogeneous impact on credit and house prices 
growth, while Galán and Lamas (2019) identify these differences in terms of default risk of 
mortgages. Poghosyan (2019) also identifies differences in the time these measures take to 
become effective depending on the direction of the policy and the position in the cycle. 
 
Overall, these results have important policy implications. Although, both types of measures are 
effective on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
the identified impact delay suggests that capital measures should be implemented promptly and 
earlier than borrower-based measures, whose benefits can be perceived more rapidly. During 
downturns, the benefits of loosening capital requirements or releasing capital buffers on 
reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are important and more immediate, while the benefits 
of loosening borrower-based measures are more limited. Certainly, given that risks materialize 
rapidly during crises, macroprudential authorities have incentives to release capital buffers 
suddenly with rapid effects on improving the banking sector resilience. On the other hand, it is 
very likely that loosening borrower-based measures during busts would not be binding given 
that the unfavourable macrofinancial environment incentivise banks to self-regulate by tightening 
their credit conditions. 
 
5. Robustness 
 
5.1. Endogeneity of macroprudential measures 
5.1.1. Macroprudential measures from international regulation 
A concern that may arise with the inclusion of macroprudential policy in the models is that it is 
potentially endogenous to future GDP growth. That is, although financial and business cycles 
have been identified to have different lengths (Claessens et al., 2012; Galati et al., 2016) and 
macroprudential policies are intended to respond to the former, macroprudential authorities may 
take decisions on these instruments using prospective information and expectations on the 
business cycle. In this context, macroprudential measures taken by national authorities might be 
d pendent on those xpect ti s, arising an endogeneity problem. In or er to void this
otential b as introduced in the r sults above, I include an alternative MPI built o ly on strict
exogenous measures. For that purpose, I keep only macroprudential measures reported in the
databa e as coming from transpositions of int rnational regulation. Figu e A6 in the Annex
resents a comparison of macroprud ntial measures based on national and international
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to the estimated reduction on the median GDP growth. On the other hand, the impact of 
loosening borrower-based measures during systemic crises is more limited. It would have a 
positive impact of less than 0.5pp on growth-at-risk around two years after its implementation. 
Interestingly, in this case, there is not a clear difference between the effect in left and the right 
tails of the distribution, which seem to be affected in a similar way, while the impact on the 
median growth would be negligible. 
 
These results corroborate some previous findings on the differential effects of the effectiveness 
of borrower-based measures over the cycle. Although previous approaches estimate conditional 
mean effects and focus mostly on the impact on credit and house prices, those studies have 
found large effects when these measures are tightened during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
and a low impact when they are loosened during contractionary phases. Claessens et al. (2013) 
and Cerutti, et al. (2017) document this heterogeneous impact on credit and house prices 
growth, while Galán and Lamas (2019) identify these differences in terms of default risk of 
mortgages. Poghosyan (2019) also identifies differences in the time these measures take to 
become effective depending on the direction of the policy and the position in the cycle. 
 
Overall, these results have important policy implications. Although, both types of measures are 
effective on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth during expansionary phases of the cycle, 
the identified impact delay suggests that capital measures should be implemented promptly and 
earlier than borrower-based measures, whose benefits can be perceived more rapidly. During 
downturns, the benefits of loosening capital requirements or releasing capital buffers on 
reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are important and more immediate, while the benefits 
of loosening borrower-based measures are more limited. Certainly, given that risks materialize 
rapidly during crises, macroprudential authorities have incentives to release capital buffers 
suddenly with rapid effects on improving the banking sector resilience. On the other hand, it is 
very likely that loosening borrower-based measures during busts would not be binding given 
that the unfavourable macrofinancial environment incentivise banks to self-regulate by tightening 
their credit conditions. 
 
5. Robustness 
 
5.1. Endogeneity of macroprudential measures 
5.1.1. Macroprudential measures from international regulation 
A concern that may arise with the inclusion of macroprudential policy in the models is that it is 
potentially endogenous to future GDP growth. That is, although financial and business cycles 
have been identified to have different lengths (Claessens et al., 2012; Galati et al., 2016) and 
macroprudential policies are intended to respond to the former, macroprudential authorities may 
take decisions on these instruments using prospective information and expectations on the 
business cycle. In this context, macroprudential measures taken by national authorities might be 
dependent on those expectations, arising an endogeneity problem. In order to avoid this 
potential bias introduced in the results above, I include an alternative MPI built only on strictly 
exogenous measures. For that purpose, I keep only macroprudential measures reported in the 
database as coming from transpositions of international regulation. Figure A6 in the Annex 
presents a comparison of macroprudential measures based on national and international 
regulation. 
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Results of the quantile estimations at GDP growth horizons equal to 4 and 12 quarters are 
presented in Figure 10, where the previous MPI is replaced by the new version including only 
international regulation-based measures (MPI*). Results of the quantile estimates at both 
horizons are very similar to those reported for the original MPI above. In particular, the effect is 
positive in the 5th percentile while it is negative in the right tail of the GDP growth distribution. 
The positive impact is more evident at the longer horizon and the economic estimated effect is 
of similar magnitude. Nonetheless, the impact on the median is not significant. Interpreting these 
results in terms of costs and benefits suggests a larger net benefit. Overall, using only exogenous 
macroprudential decisions, previous results hold and seem robust to this more strict definition. 
Figure 10. Quantile estimates of the alternative macroprudential policy index based on 
international regulation (MPI*) at different horizons. 
h=4 
 
h=12 
 
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
 
5.1.2. Non-systematic macroprudential measures 
Another way to isolate potential endogeneity concerns could be splitting macroprudential 
measures into their systematic and non-systematic components. Boar et al. (2017) propose a 
way to separate macroprudential policy into these two components based on what has been 
previously attempted for monetary policy in terms of residuals of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) or 
for fiscal policy in terms of residuals of fiscal rules linked to GDP changes (Fatás and Mihov, 
2012). The authors propose to regress a macroprudential index, which is constructed in a very 
similar to the one used in this study, on the most common variables considered for taking 
macroprudential policy decisions, including credit-to-GDP growth and output growth. Therefore, 
following Boar et al. (2017) I replace the original MPI with the residuals (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of a fixed effects 
regression of the MPI on the rest of variables in the baseline specification in Eq. (6) as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3)
Figure 11 presents the quantile estimates for the non-systematic component of MPI at the two 
main GDP growth horizons analysed above. It is observed that the heterogeneous effects and 
their estimated magnitudes across quantiles are very similar to those obtained using the original 
MPI proposed above. This would imply that the impact of macroprudential policy on the GDP 
growth distribution is robust to accounting for only non-systematic decisions, thereby alleviating 
endogeneity concerns regarding factors associated to systematic macroprudential decisions in 
the exercises performed above. 
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Figure 11. Quantile estimates of the non-systematic component of macroprudential policy at 
different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands.. 
 
5.2. A continuous measure of capital requirements: the solvency ratio 
The assessed macroprudential measures have identified the impact of the direction of policies 
(i.e. tightening or loosening) but their magnitude has been omitted from the exercise given the 
complexity of creating intensity measures for the different types of instruments in the sample. 
Nonetheless, in the case of capital measures most of the requirements and buffers are linked to 
the solvency ratio, which can be used as a proxy for the intensity of this type of macroprudential 
policies. Solvency and capital ratios are usually used for this purpose in empirical studies. In 
fact, Aikman et al. (2019b) include this variable directly in a growth-at-risk model to forecast GDP 
growth after the implementation of different CCyB rates. It is important to remark that this 
variable assumes that banks only increase their solvency ratio due to regulatory requirements 
and that macroprudential capital-based policies have a direct effect on increasing the solvency 
ratio. However, in practice it is possible that capital measures are not binding due to the 
existence of voluntary or management capital buffers. Also, endogeneity issues may arise given 
that banks may take decision on their level of solvency given GDP growth expectations.  
Figure 12 shows the estimated coefficients across quantiles for the same GDP growth horizons 
assessed above. It is observed that an increase of 1pp in the solvency ratio has important 
differential effects on the conditional GDP growth distribution across quantiles. While the median 
effect is negative in the short-run, which is consistent with most of studies assessing the impact 
of capital and solvency ratios on the conditional mean GDP growth (Noss and Toffano, 2016; 
Jiménez et al., 2017), the impact on the left tail of the distribution is clearly positive identifying 
the benefits of the increase in the resilience of the banking sector. The negative impact on the 
right tail can also be interpreted as the effect on smoothing the cycle, which is a secondary 
objective of some capital measures such as the CCyB. In the mid-term, the differences across 
the distribution are less notorious, except for the right tail, where no significant effects are 
observed. In contrast to the results obtained above using the narrative measure, the largest 
positive impact of increasing capital is identified in the short-run. This may reflect the fact that 
this variable captures directly changes in the solvency ratio rather than the implementation of 
capital measures by national authorities, which would have a delay in affecting banks balances. 
Also, as it was aforementioned, the narrative measure identifies the tightening or loosening of 
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presented in Figure 10, where the previous MPI is replaced by the new version including only 
international regulation-based measures (MPI*). Results of the quantile estimates at both 
horizons are very similar to those reported for the original MPI above. In particular, the effect is 
positive in the 5th percentile while it is negative in the right tail of the GDP growth distribution. 
The positive impact is more evident at the longer horizon and the economic estimated effect is 
of similar magnitude. Nonetheless, the impact on the median is not significant. Interpreting these 
results in t rms of costs and benefits uggests a larger net benefit. Overall, using only exog nous
macroprudential decisions, previous results hold and seem robust to this more strict definition. 
Figure 10. Quantile estimates of the alternative macroprudential policy index based on 
international regulation (MPI*) at different horizons. 
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Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
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Figure 11 presents the quantile estimates for the non-systematic component of MPI at the two 
main GDP growth horizons analysed above. It is observed that the heterogeneous effects and 
their estimated magnitudes across quantiles are very similar to those obtained using the original 
MPI proposed above. This would imply that the impact of macroprudential policy on the GDP 
growth distribution is robust to accounting for only non-systematic decisions, thereby alleviating 
endogeneity concerns regarding factors associated to systematic macroprudential decisions in 
the exercises performed above. 
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Figure 11. Quantile estimates of the non-systematic component of macroprudential policy at 
different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
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red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands.. 
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Results of the quantile estimations at GDP growth horizons equal to 4 and 12 quarters are 
presented in Fig re 10, where the previous MPI is replaced by the new version including only
int rna ional re lation-based measures (MPI*). R sults of the quantil  estimates at both
horizons are v ry similar to those repo ted for the original MPI above. I  particular, the effect is
p sitive in the 5th percen ile while it is n gative in the right tail of th  GDP growth distribution.
The positive impact is mor evid n at the longer horizon and the economic estimated effect is
of similar magnitude. Noneth less, the impact on t e medi  is not significant. Interpr ting these
results in terms of costs and benefits suggests a larger net benefit. Overall, using only xo enous
macroprudential decisions, pr viou result  hold and seem robust to this more strict definiti n. 
Figure 10. Quantile estimates of the alternative macroprudential policy index based on 
international regulation (MPI*) at di ferent horizons. 
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Note: The vertical axes repres nt th  values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the qua tiles, th  
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line repres s the value f zero, and the dark and light ashed horizontal lines represent the stimated coefficie ts 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
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Figure 11 presents the quantile estimates for the non-systematic component of MPI at the two 
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the r estimated magnitude cros  qu ntiles are very similar to hose obtained using th  original
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Results of the quantile estimations at GDP growth horizons equal to 4 and 12 quarters are 
presented in Figure 10, where the previous MPI is replaced by the new version including only 
international regulation-based measures (MPI*). Results of the quantile estimates at both 
horizons are very similar to those reported for the original MPI above. In particular, the effect is 
positive in the 5th percentile while it is negative in the right tail of the GDP growth distribution. 
The positive impact is more evident at the longer horizon and the economic estimated effect is 
of similar magnitude. Nonetheless, the impact on the median is not significant. Interpreting these 
results in terms of costs and benefits suggests a larger net benefit. Overall, using only exogenous 
macroprudential decisions, previous results hold and seem robust to this more strict definition. 
Figure 10. Quantile estimates of the alternative macroprudential policy index based on 
international regulation (MPI*) at different horizons. 
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Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
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conditions on banks’ capital, which are not necessarily observed through changes in the 
solvency ratio.   
Figure 12. Impact of a 1pp increase in the solvency ratio on the quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution at different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
 
 
5.3. Alternative estimation methods: Two-steps additive fixed effects, quantiles via moments 
 
In this study I take advantage of the panel structure with large time series observations with 
respect to the cross-sectional dimension in order to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity by including directly fixed effects at each quantile (Koenker and Geling 2001). 
Nonetheless, when T is small in relative terms to N, the estimates of the common parameters 
may be biased or under-identified and the alternative methods described in section 3 to 
overcome these issues should be used for the estimations. In this section, two of the most used 
methods are estimated to check whether or not the obtained results could be dependent on the 
estimation method.  In particular, I apply the two-step additive fixed effects estimator proposed 
by Canay (2011) and previously used from a financial stability perspective by Aikman et al. 
(2019b), and the quantile via moments method proposed recently by Machado and Santos Silva 
(2019). 
 
Canay (2011) proposes to estimate a panel linear regression of the variable of interest on the 
explanatory variables and to use the prediction after averaging over T as an estimated fixed 
effect to be subtracted from the variable of interest, and then to estimate the quantile regressions 
using the transformed dependent variable. On the other hand, Machado and Santos Silva (2019) 
propose the estimation of quantiles via moments in order to estimate panel data models with 
individual effects. The method estimates the conditional mean and scale functions, which 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution, providing equivalent 
information to that obtained from regression quantiles. Figure 13 presents the estimated 
coefficients for the MPI in quantile regressions of GDP growth 12-quarters ahead (Figure A7 in 
the Annex presents the estimated coefficients of the macrofinancial variables). Estimation results 
from these two methods are consistent with those presented above, both in terms of the 
differences across quantiles and the economic effects. This is also observed when the exercise 
is replicated for different horizons.  
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Figure 11. Quantile estimates of the non-systematic component of macroprudential policy at 
different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands.. 
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existence of voluntary or management capital buffers. Also, endogeneity issues may arise given 
that banks may take decision on their level of solvency given GDP growth expectations.  
Figure 12 shows the estimated coefficients across quantiles for the same GDP growth horizons 
assessed above. It is observed that an increase of 1pp in the solvency ratio has important 
differential effects on the conditional GDP growth distribution across quantiles. While the median 
effect is negative in the short-run, which is consistent with most of studies assessing the impact 
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Jiménez et al., 2017), the impact on the left tail of the distribution is clearly positive identifying 
the benefits of the increase in the resilience of the banking sector. The negative impact on the 
right tail can also be interpreted as the effect on smoothing the cycle, which is a secondary 
objective of some capital measures such as the CCyB. In the mid-term, the differences across 
the distribution are less notorious, except for the right tail, where no significant effects are 
observed. In contrast to the results obtained above using the narrative measure, the largest 
positive impact of increasing capital is identified in the short-run. This may reflect the fact that 
this variable captures directly changes in the solvency ratio rather than the implementation of 
capital measures by national authorities, which would have a delay in affecting banks balances. 
Also, as it was aforementioned, the narrative measure identifies the tightening or loosening of 
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conditions on banks’ capital, which are not necessarily observed through changes in the 
solvency ratio.   
Figure 12. Impact of a 1pp increase in the solvency ratio on the quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution at different horizons. 
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Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
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propose the estimation of quantiles via moments in order to estimate panel data models with 
individual effects. The method estimates the conditional mean and scale functions, which 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution, providing equivalent 
information to that obtained from regression quantiles. Figure 13 presents the estimated 
coefficients for the MPI in quantile regressions of GDP growth 12-quarters ahead (Figure A7 in 
the Annex presents the estimated coefficients of the macrofinancial variables). Estimation results 
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Figure 12. Impact of a 1pp increase in the solvency ratio on the quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution at different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
 
 
5.3. Alternative estimation methods: Two-steps additive fixed effects, quantiles via moments 
 
In this study I take advantage of the panel structure with large time series observations with 
respect to the cross-sectional dimension in order to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity by including directly fixed effects at each quantile (Koenker and Geling 2001). 
Nonetheless, when T is small in relative terms to N, the estimates of the common parameters 
may be biased or under-identified and the alternative methods described in section 3 to 
overcome these issues should be used for the estimations. In this section, two of the most used 
methods are estimated to check whether or not the obtained results could be dependent on the 
estimation method.  In particular, I apply the two-step additive fixed effects estimator proposed 
by Canay (2011) and previously used from a financial stability perspective by Aikman et al. 
(2019b), and the quantile via moments method proposed recently by Machado and Santos Silva 
(2019). 
 
Canay (2011) proposes to estimate a panel linear regression of the variable of interest on the 
explanatory variables and to use the prediction after averaging over T as an estimated fixed 
effect to be subtracted from the variable of interest, and then to estimate the quantile regressions 
using the transformed dependent variable. On the other hand, Machado and Santos Silva (2019) 
propose the estimation of quantiles via moments in order to estimate panel data models with 
individual effects. The method estimates the conditional mean and scale functions, which 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution, providing equivalent 
information to that obtained from regression quantiles. Figure 13 presents the estimated 
coefficients for the MPI in quantile regressions of GDP growth 12-quarters ahead (Figure A7 in 
the Annex presents the estimated coefficients of the macrofinancial variables). Estimation results 
from these two methods are consistent with those presented above, both in terms of the 
differences across quantiles and the economic effects. This is also observed when the exercise 
is replicated for different horizons.  
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Figure 11. uantile esti ates of the non-syste atic co ponent of acroprudential policy at 
different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the esti ated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95  confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the esti ated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95  confidence bands.. 
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co plexity of creating intensity easures for the different types of instru ents in the sa ple. 
onetheless, in the case of capital easures ost of the require ents and buffers are linked to 
the solvency ratio, hich can be used as a proxy for the intensity of this type of acroprudential 
policies. olvency and capital ratios are usually used for this purpose in e pirical studies. In 
fact, ik an et al. (2019b) include this variable directly in a gro th-at-risk odel to forecast  
gro th after the i ple entation of different y  rates. It is i portant to re ark that this 
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ratio. o ever, in practice it is possible that capital easures are not binding due to the 
existence of voluntary or anage ent capital buffers. lso, endogeneity issues ay arise given 
that banks ay take decision on their level of solvency given  gro th expectations.  
Figure 12 sho s the esti ated coefficients across quantiles for the sa e  gro th horizons 
assessed above. It is observed that an increase of 1pp in the solvency ratio has i portant 
differential effects on the conditional  gro th distribution across quantiles. hile the edian 
effect is negative in the short-run, hich is consistent ith ost of studies assessing the i pact 
of capital and solvency ratios on the conditional ean  gro th ( oss and Toffano, 2016; 
Ji énez et al., 2017), the i pact on the left tail of the distribution is clearly positive identifying 
the benefits of the increase in the resilience of the banking sector. The negative i pact on the 
right tail can also be interpreted as the effect on s oothing the cycle, hich is a secondary 
objective of so e capital easures such as the y . In the id-ter , the differences across 
the distribution are less notorious, except for the right tail, here no significant effects are 
observed. In contrast to the results obtained above using the narrative easure, the largest 
positive i pact of increasing capital is identified in the short-run. This ay reflect the fact that 
this variable captures directly changes in the solvency ratio rather than the i ple entation of 
capital easures by national authorities, hich ould have a delay in affecting banks balances. 
lso, as it as afore entioned, the narrative easure identifies the tightening or loosening of 
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continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands.. 
 
5.2. A continuous measure of capital requirements: the solvency ratio 
The assessed macroprudential measures have identified the impact of the direction of policies 
(i.e. tightening or loosening) but their magnitude has been omitted from the exercise given the 
complexity of creating intensity measures for the different types of instruments in the sample. 
Nonetheless, in the case of capital measures most of the requirements and buffers are linked to 
the solvency ratio, which can be used as a proxy for the intensity of this type of macroprudential 
policies. Solvency and capital ratios are usually used for this purpose in empirical studies. In 
fact, Aikman et al. (2019b) include this variable directly in a growth-at-risk model to forecast GDP 
growth after the implementation of different CCyB rates. It is important to remark that this 
variable assumes that banks only increase their solvency ratio due to regulatory requirements 
and that macroprudential capital-based policies have a direct effect on increasing the solvency 
ratio. However, in practice it is possible that capital measures are not binding due to the 
existence of voluntary or management capital buffers. Also, endogeneity issues may arise given 
that banks may take decision on their level of solvency given GDP growth expectations.  
Figure 12 shows the estimated coefficients across quantiles for the same GDP growth horizons 
assessed above. It is observed that an increase of 1pp in the solvency ratio has important 
differential effects on the conditional GDP growth distribution across quantiles. While the median 
effect is negative in the short-run, which is consistent with most of studies assessing the impact 
of capital and solvency ratios on the conditional mean GDP growth (Noss and Toffano, 2016; 
Jiménez et al., 2017), the impact on the left tail of the distribution is clearly positive identifying 
the benefits of the increase in the resilience of the banking sector. The negative impact on the 
right tail can also be interpreted as the effect on smoothing the cycle, which is a secondary 
objective of some capital measures such as the CCyB. In the mid-term, the differences across 
the distribution are less notorious, except for the right tail, where no significant effects are 
observed. In contrast to the results obtained above using the narrative measure, the largest 
positive impact of increasing capital is identified in the short-run. This may reflect the fact that 
this variable captures directly changes in the solvency ratio rather than the implementation of 
capital measures by national authorities, which would have a delay in affecting banks balances. 
Also, as it was aforementioned, the narrative measure identifies the tightening or loosening of 
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conditions on banks’ capital, which are not necessarily observed through changes in the 
solvency ratio.   
Figure 12. Impact of a 1pp increase in the solvency ratio on the quantiles of the GDP growth 
distribution at different horizons. 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. 
 
 
5.3. Alternative estimation methods: Two-steps additive fixed effects, quantiles via moments 
 
In this study I take advantage of the panel structure with large time series observations with 
respect to the cross-sectional dimension in order to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity by including directly fixed effects at each quantile (Koenker and Geling 2001). 
Nonetheless, when T is small in relative terms to N, the estimates of the common parameters 
may be biased or under-identified and the alternative methods described in section 3 to 
overcome these issues should be used for the estimations. In this section, two of the most used 
methods are estimated to check whether or not the obtained results could be dependent on the 
estimation method.  In particular, I apply the two-step additive fixed effects estimator proposed 
by Canay (2011) and previously used from a financial stability perspective by Aikman et al. 
(2019b), and the quantile via moments method proposed recently by Machado and Santos Silva 
(2019). 
 
Canay (2011) proposes to estimate a panel linear regression of the variable of interest on the 
explanatory variables and to use the prediction after averaging over T as an estimated fixed 
effect to be subtracted from the variable of interest, and then to estimate the quantile regressions 
using the transformed dependent variable. On the other hand, Machado and Santos Silva (2019) 
propose the estimation of quantiles via moments in order to estimate panel data models with 
individual effects. The method estimates the conditional mean and scale functions, which 
characterize how the regressors affect the conditional distribution, providing equivalent 
information to that obtained from regression quantiles. Figure 13 presents the estimated 
coefficients for the MPI in quantile regressions of GDP growth 12-quarters ahead (Figure A7 in 
the Annex presents the estimated coefficients of the macrofinancial variables). Estimation results 
from these two methods are consistent with those presented above, both in terms of the 
differences across quantiles and the economic effects. This is also observed when the exercise 
is replicated for different horizons.   
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Figure 13. Estimated coefficients of MPI under alternative fixed effects quantile methods (h=12) 
Canay (2011) 
 
Machado and Santos Silva (2019) 
 
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. In the model of Machado and Santos Silva (2019) the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 
95th percentiles are estimated. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I bring together recent developments on the impact assessment of macroprudential 
policies and the growth-at-risk methodology. The main purpose of the study is to identify 
heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies on the GDP growth distribution at different 
horizons, which allow assessing the costs and benefits of macroprudential policies in terms of 
the same unit of measure. Certainly, most of previous studies on the impact of macroprudential 
policy have identified benefits in different dimensions such as curbing credit and house prices 
growth (Claessens et al., 2013; Cerutti et al., 2017); reducing the probability of systemic crises 
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016); increasing the probability of survivor of firms in a crisis (Jiménez et al., 
2017); or decreasing the probability of banks’ default (Altunbas et al., 2018), among others. 
However, these measures are difficult to translate in terms of a homogeneous measure of 
economic activity. On the other hand, the few recent studies assessing directly the impact of 
macroprudential policies on GDP growth usually find negative effects, which are associated to 
the costs of macroprudential policy (Kim and Mehrotra, 2018; Richter et al. 2018).  
For this purpose, I extend the recent proposal by Adrian et al. (2019) on the use of quantile 
regressions of GDP growth conditional on financial conditions in three dimensions. First, by 
splitting the variables included in the model into: i) macrofinancial variables with mid-term early 
warning properties of cyclical systemic risk such as credit growth, house prices growth and 
external imbalances, which allow characterizing GDP growth at longer horizons; and, ii) a 
financial stress index that incorporates information related to the materialization of systemic risk 
and then more associated to GDP growth at short horizons. Second, by focusing on the 
assessment of the impact of the implementation of macroprudential policies on the GDP growth 
distribution rather than forecasting future GDP growth densities. Third, by using a panel 
specification, which allows taking advantage of more information, mainly regarding the use of 
macroprudential policies, while accounting for country-level fixed effects. I collect quarterly data 
on those variables for the 28 EU countries from 1970 to 2018.  
 
Results confirm the existence of heterogeneous effects of both macrofinancial variables and 
macroprudential policy across the quantiles of the GDP growth distribution, which also varies 
over the assessed horizons. In particular, macroprudential policy is found to have a negative 
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impact on the median of the GDP growth distribution, which is consistent with previous literature 
focusing on conditional mean effects. However, a significant positive impact on reducing the 
downside risk of GDP growth is identified. This uncovers the benefits of macroprudential policy 
in terms of future GDP growth, which are only evident when focusing on the left tail of the 
distribution.  
 
Moreover, the positive effects on growth-at-risk are found to be larger than the negative effects 
on the median, suggesting a net benefit of macroprudential policy via lower severe GDP 
contractions. Nonetheless, the position in the financial cycle has a relevant role on determining 
the magnitude and speed of the effects of macroprudential policy on the GDP growth 
distribution. In particular, tightening macroprudential policy during normal times or expansionary 
phases of the financial cycle has a large impact in the mid-term, while loosening policies has a 
more immediate positive effect on reducing the downside risk of GDP during crises. These 
results may capture the reaction of macroprudential authorities over the cycle. That is, during 
upswings vulnerabilities tend to cumulate slowly and macroprudential authorities would take 
more paused tightening decisions. On the contrary, during busts risks tend to materialize quickly 
leading macroprudential authorities to loose measures rapidly.  
Differences are also identified depending on the type of macroprudential instrument 
implemented. While the effects of borrower-based measures on the left-tail of the conditional 
GDP growth distribution are manifested very rapidly and tend to be persistent, the positive 
effects of capital measures present a delay of around 8 quarters in becoming evident and dilute 
16 quarters after their implementation. These results have important policy implications. 
Although, both types of measures are found to be effective on reducing the downside risk of 
GDP growth, capital measures should be implemented early enough in the cycle, while borrower-
based measures can be tightened also in advanced stages given that their benefits are perceived 
more rapidly. Conversely, during crises the benefits of loosening capital requirements or 
releasing capital buffers on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are economically 
significant and more immediate, while those of loosening borrower-based measures are limited. 
Certainly, releasing capital buffers during busts allow banks to increase their resilience 
immediately, while withdrawing or relaxing caps on lending standards may not have real effects 
given that banks have incentives to self-regulate by tightening their credit conditions due to the 
unfavourable macrofinancial environment. 
 
Overall, this study provides a useful framework to estimate the impact of macroprudential 
policies by distinguishing between costs and benefits in terms of GDP growth, and to assess the 
effects of specific instruments over the cycle, which is identified to be of a high relevance for 
policy decisions. 
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Figure 13. Estimated coefficients of MPI under alternative fixed effects quantile methods (h=12) 
Canay (2011) 
 
Machado and Santos Silva (2019) 
 
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, the horizontal 
red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent the estimated coefficients 
via OLS and their 95% confidence bands. In the model of Machado and Santos Silva (2019) the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 
95th percentiles are estimated. 
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external imbalances, which allow characterizing GDP growth at longer horizons; and, ii) a 
financial stress index that incorporates information related to the materialization of systemic risk 
and then more associated to GDP growth at short horizons. Second, by focusing on the 
assessment of the impact of the implementation of macroprudential policies on the GDP growth 
distribution rather than forecasting future GDP growth densities. Third, by using a panel 
specification, which allows taking advantage of more information, mainly regarding the use of 
macroprudential policies, while accounting for country-level fixed effects. I collect quarterly data 
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In this paper, I bring together recent developments on the impact assessment of macroprudential 
policies and the growth-at-risk methodology. The main purpose of the study is to identify 
heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies on the GDP growth distribution at different 
horizons, which allow assessing the costs and benefits of macroprudential policies in terms of 
the same unit of measure. Certainly, most of previous studies on the impact of macroprudential 
policy have identified benefits in different dimensions such as curbing credit and house prices 
growth (Claessens et al., 2013; Cerutti et al., 2017); reducing the probability of systemic crises 
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016); increasing the probability of survivor of firms in a crisis (Jiménez et al., 
2017); or decreasing the probability of banks’ default (Altunbas et al., 2018), among others. 
However, these measures are difficult to translate in terms of a homogeneous measure of 
economic activity. On the other hand, the few recent studies assessing directly the impact of 
macroprudential policies on GDP growth usually find negative effects, which are associated to 
the costs of macroprudential policy (Kim and Mehrotra, 2018; Richter et al. 2018).  
For this purpose, I extend the recent proposal by Adrian et al. (2019) on the use of quantile 
regressions of GDP growth conditional on financial conditions in three dimensions. First, by 
splitting the variables included in the model into: i) macrofinancial variables with mid-term early 
warning properties of cyclical systemic risk such as credit growth, house prices growth and 
external imbalances, which allow characterizing GDP growth at longer horizons; and, ii) a 
financial stress index that incorporates information related to the materialization of systemic risk 
and then more associated to GDP growth at short horizons. Second, by focusing on the 
assessment of the impact of the implementation of macroprudential policies on the GDP growth 
distribution rather than forecasting future GDP growth densities. Third, by using a panel 
specification, which allows taking advantage of more information, mainly regarding the use of 
macroprudential policies, while accounting for country-level fixed effects. I collect quarterly data 
on those variables for the 28 EU countries from 1970 to 2018.  
 
Results confirm the existence of heterogeneous effects of both macrofinancial variables and 
macroprudential policy across the quantiles of the GDP growth distribution, which also varies 
over the assessed horizons. In particular, macroprudential policy is found to have a negative 
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impact on the median of the GDP growth distribution, which is consistent with previous literature 
focusing on conditional mean effects. However, a significant positive impact on reducing the
downside risk of GDP growth is identified. This uncovers the benefits of macroprudential policy 
in terms of future GDP growth, which are only evident when focusing on the left tail of the 
distribution.  
 
Moreover, the positive effects on growth-at-risk are found to be larger than the negative effects 
on the median, suggesting a net benefit of macroprudential policy via lower severe GDP 
contractions. Nonetheless, the position in the financial cycle has a relevant role on determining 
the magnitude and speed of the effects of macroprudential policy on the GDP growth 
distribution. In particular, tightening macroprudential policy during normal times or expansionary 
phases of the financial cycle has a large impact in the mid-term, while loosening policies has a 
more immediate positive effect on reducing the downside risk of GDP during crises. These 
results may capture the reaction of macroprudential authorities over the cycle. That is, during 
upswings vulnerabilities tend to cumulate slowly and macroprudential authorities would take 
more paused tightening decisions. On the contrary, during busts risks tend to materialize quickly 
leading macroprudential authorities to loose measures rapidly.  
Differences are also identified depending on the type of macroprudential instrument 
implemented. While the effects of borrower-based measures on the left-tail of the conditional 
GDP growth distribution are manifested very rapidly and tend to be persistent, the positive 
effects of capital measures present a delay of around 8 quarters in becoming evident and dilute 
16 quarters after their implementation. These results have important policy implications. 
Although, both types of measures are found to be effective on reducing the downside risk of 
GDP growth, capital measures should be implemented early enough in the cycle, while borrower-
based measures can be tightened also in advanced stages given that their benefits are perceived 
more rapidly. Conversely, during crises the benefits of loosening capital requirements or 
releasing capital buffers on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are economically 
significant and more immediate, while those of loosening borrower-based measures are limited. 
Certainly, releasing capital buffers during busts allow banks to increase their resilience 
immediately, while withdrawing or relaxing caps on lending standards may not have real effects 
given that banks have incentives to self-regulate by tightening their credit conditions due to the 
unfavourable macrofinancial environment. 
 
Overall, this study provides a useful framework to estimate the impact of macroprudential 
policies by distinguishing between costs and benefits in terms of GDP growth, and to assess the 
effects of specific instruments over the cycle, which is identified to be of a high relevance for 
policy decisions. 
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impact on the median of the GDP growth distribution, which is consistent with previous literature 
focusing on conditional mean effects. However, a significant positive impact on reducing the 
downside risk of GDP growth is identified. This uncovers the benefits of macroprudential policy 
in terms of future GDP growth, which are only evident when focusing on the left tail of the 
distribution.  
 
Moreover, the positive effects on growth-at-risk are found to be larger than the negative effects 
on the median, suggesting a net benefit of macroprudential policy via lower severe GDP 
contractions. Nonetheless, the position in the financial cycle has a relevant role on determining 
the magnitude and speed of the effects of macroprudential policy on the GDP growth 
distribution. In particular, tightening macroprudential policy during normal times or expansionary 
phases of the financial cycle has a large impact in the mid-term, while loosening policies has a 
more immediate positive effect on reducing the downside risk of GDP during crises. These 
results may capture the reaction of macroprudential authorities over the cycle. That is, during 
upswings vulnerabilities tend to cumulate slowly and macroprudential authorities would take 
more paused tightening decisions. On the contrary, during busts risks tend to materialize quickly 
leading macroprudential authorities to loose measures rapidly.  
Differences are also identified depending on the type of macroprudential instrument 
implemented. While the effects of borrower-based measures on the left-tail of the conditional 
GDP growth distribution are manifested very rapidly and tend to be persistent, the positive 
effects of capital measures present a delay of around 8 quarters in becoming evident and dilute 
16 quarters after their implementation. These results have important policy implications. 
Although, both types of measures are found to be effective on reducing the downside risk of 
GDP growth, capital measures should be implemented early enough in the cycle, while borrower-
based measures can be tightened also in advanced stages given that their benefits are perceived 
more rapidly. Conversely, during crises the benefits of loosening capital requirements or 
releasing capital buffers on reducing the downside risk of GDP growth are economically 
significant and more immediate, while those of loosening borrower-based measures are limited. 
Certainly, releasing capital buffers during busts allow banks to increase their resilience 
immediately, while withdrawing or relaxing caps on lending standards may not have real effects 
given that banks have incentives to self-regulate by tightening their credit conditions due to the 
unfavourable macrofinancial environment. 
 
Overall, this study provides a useful framework to estimate the impact of macroprudential 
policies by distinguishing between costs and benefits in terms of GDP growth, and to assess the 
effects of specific instruments over the cycle, which is identified to be of a high relevance for 
policy decisions. 
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Annex 
 
Figure A1. Normal probability plot of annual GDP growth 
 
Note: The vertical axis represent the quantiles of the annual GDP growth and the horizontal axis represent the quantiles 
under a normal distribution. Deviations from the diagonal blue line indicate deviations from a normal distribution. 
 
Figure A2. Number of implemented macroprudential policies by country (1970-2018) 
 
Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration. 
Note: The vertical axis represent the number of macroprudential measures implemented from 1970 to 2018 by each 
country in the 9 categories described in Section 2, excluding those where the level or scope of the measure is hold 
unchanged. 
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Figure A3. Tightening and loosening macroprudential decisions in the EU over time 
 
Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration. 
Note: The vertical axis represent the number of macroprudential measures implemented by the 28 EU countries from 
1970 to 2018 in the 9 categories described in Section 2, excluding those where the level or scope of the measure is 
hold unchanged. 
 
Figure A4. Estimated quantile regression coefficients of contemporaneous GDP growth 
h=4 h=12 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles of the GDP 
growth distribution, the continuous dark green line represents the value of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, 
the grey shaded areas represent the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 
replications, the horizontal red line represents the value of zero, and the dark and light dashed horizontal lines represent 
the estimated coefficients via OLS and their corresponding 95% confidence bands 
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Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration. 
Note: The vertical axis represent the number of macroprudential measures implemented by the 28 EU countries from 
1970 to 2018 in the 9 categories described in Section 2, excluding those where the level or scope of the measure is 
hold unchanged. 
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Figure A5. Impulse response of tightening and loosening macroprudential measures over the 
cycle at different horizons (5th and 50th percentiles).  
5th percentile 50th  percentile 
Tightening during non-crises periods 
  
Loosening during financial crises periods 
  
Notes: Results presented are derived from quantile regressions where the baseline specification is modified by replacing 
the MPI with two dummy variables capturing the direction (tightening or loosening) of a macroprudential measure 
implemented by each country in a given period of time. Interactions of these two variables with crises periods are also 
included. The solid lines represent the impulse responses of tightening and loosening macroprudential measures on the 
5th and 50th percentiles of the conditional GDP growth distribution from 1 to 16 quarters ahead. The dotted lines represent 
the 95% confidence bands obtained using bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
 
Figure A6. Implementation of macroprudential policies in the EU over time: international vs 
national regulatory-based measures 
 
Source: ECB Macroprudential Database. Own elaboration. 
Note: The vertical axis represent the number of macroprudential measures implemented by the 28 EU countries from 
1970 to 2018 in the 9 categories described in Section 2, excluding those where the level or scope of the measure is hold 
unchanged. Macroprudential measures are separated into those being transpositions of international regulation and 
those taken at national level. 
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Figure A7. Estimated coefficients of macrofinancial variables with alternative methods (h=12). 
Canay (2011) Machado and Santos Silva (2019) 
Credit-to-GDP growth 
  
House prices growth 
 
 
Current account balance 
  
CLIFS 
  
Note: The vertical axes represent the values of the coefficients, the horizontal axes represent the quantiles, the 
continuous dark lines represents the values of the estimated coefficients at every quantile, the grey shaded areas 
represent the 95% confidence bands estimated via bootstrapping, the horizontal red line represents the value of zero. 
In the model based on Machado and Santos Silva (2019) the estimated percentiles are the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th. 
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